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Situating videogames and the meaningful practice of playing videogames for 
future study by the discipline of communication, this eidetic phenomenology centers 
the focus of such inquiry at the site of the body.  As videogame studies have 
heretofore largely ignored or presupposed a bifurcation between player and 
videogame, a phenomenology is likewise crucial to investigating the lived experience 
of videogaming as an embodied activity by theoretically eschewing such 
subject/object distinctions and methodologically generating genuinely new, heuristic 
spaces for thinking about this phenomenon. 
In particular, the existential phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
which emphasizes the body as necessarily enworlded, offers an insightful 
conceptualization of the videogame player’s intentional and meaningful endeavor.  
Merleau-Ponty’s latter work specifically details the intricacies of a body’s sense of 
touch, outlining three specific modalities: “a touching of the sleek and the rough,” a 
“touching of the things,” and “a veritable touching of the touch.”  The notion of touch 
is also key in portraying the already-imbricated nature of player and videogame. 
Using these modalities as frames for organizing experience, I enact 
performative playings of the videogame Animal Crossing: Wild World by Nintendo.  
This study proceeds methodologically by way of the three-step phenomenological 
method outlined by Merleau-Ponty – one that necessarily entails a description, a 
reduction, and an interpretation.  Performative playings generate descriptive data later 
thematized as capta in order to synthetically produce acta, or an interpretive 
orientation toward the data/capta relationship.  Each of three phenomenological 
reflections respectively examines one of these modalities. 
The first reflection (upon “a touching of the sleek and the rough”) explores the 
ways in which the sensual touch of the player both intersects with a new material 
technology that facilitates gameplay (the Nintendo DS videogame console) by way of 
a touch-sensitive interface, and “crisscrosses” with a player’s embodied sense of 
sight.  Framed by the human-technology-world relations outlined by technoscience 
philosopher Don Ihde, descriptions of these intersections and crisscrosses yield 
interpretations of a corporeal schema with specific embodied preferences for action in 
various gamic spaces: a being-in-the-(game)world. 
The second reflection (upon “a touching of the things”) interrogates my 
interobjective relations with other enworlded body-objects.  While I have a body that 
interacts with this technology, I also am a body – a material object grounded in the 
self-same flesh of the world.  By way of Vivian Sobchack’s philosophy of 
interobjectivity, I recognize that I am a passionate videogame player, and literally re-
cognize my primordial, immanent and embodied abilities as both subjective object 
and objective subject to interpret my experiences being “touched” by the objects of 
the gameworld (whose inhabitance I detailed in the first reflection). 
The third reflection (upon “a veritable touching of the touch”) uses the first 
two as an experiential ground to explore the ways in which I and other players “keep 
in touch” by playing videogames.  My descriptions of these videogaming experiences 
indicate the presence of Roman Jakobson’s six elements and correlative functions 
integral to an understanding of human communication, specifically situating 
videogames for study by the discipline of communication. Playing videogames is an 
interactive practice that synthesizes the analog (both/and) logic of human player-
subjects and the digital (either/or) logic of game-objects as they emerge from an 
undifferentiated, chiasmic interrelationship.  Operating from a digital-analog logic 
allows players to convert contexts of choice into choices of context. 
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FOREWORD (PRESS START TO BEGIN) 
 
March 6, 2004, was, quite simply, a great day to be alive. 
It was a fabulous day for many reasons: it was the first day of spring break 
during my junior year in college; it became beautifully sunny after some light 
showers that cooled the air and earth in the early morning; and I was spending it with 
my best friend, Chris, whom I hadn’t seen for many, many weeks. 
Much like our undergraduate cohorts, we were using the first day of spring 
break for a road trip.  But unlike others we knew – who were driving to Cancun, 
Ontario and elsewhere – we were spending the first day of our long-awaited spring 
break at school. 
The destination: Princeton University, only a few hours from our 
neighborhood in suburban Pennsylvania.  The university, whose name is synonymous 
with prestige, was hosting the first academic conference about videogames ever to be 
held at an Ivy League school.  It was the kind of high-culture/low-culture collision 
that makes geeks squirm with delight.  Chris and I were salivating like über-nerd 
Pavlovian drones. 
Friends since early childhood, Chris and I owed much of our friendship to 
videogames.  When I was in second grade, and my mom restricted my videogame 
playing time to a mere 30 minutes per day, I would trudge up the block to Chris’ 
house, where the Nintendo Entertainment System was waiting, obscured from the 
watchful eyes of Big Mother.  Chris was always ready with a second controller. 
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Our lives unfolded behind those controllers and those screens.  We solidified 
an elementary school friendship over Super Mario Bros. 3, talked junior high school 
romances through intermittent pauses in The Punisher, and negotiated the social 
stresses of high school via Goldeneye 64.  Both in college now, we talked games 
when we could, but more frequently, life was getting in the way of play. 
Then, on March 6, Christmas came early.  I had read about the conference in 
the New York Times and hopped online to shoot Chris an instant message with a 
hyperlink to the story. 
“This is historic,” I wrote, and waited for his response, which came some 
moments later when he had finished reading the piece. 
 “We’re going.” 
So as we rolled into a Princeton parking lot, and I tried to keep the misty 
drizzle from besmirching my vintage Atari Defender T-shirt, neither of us had any 
doubts about the great time we were going to have (“Academics want to talk about 
videogames?  At a university?  At an Ivy League university?  And I don’t have to pay 
to hear them?”). 
We weren’t disappointed, of course.  That day, we heard the intellectuals 
weigh in regarding virtual economies emerging from massively multiplayer online 
videogames; cyber crime and virtual theft; narratological spaces in Super Mario 
Bros.; the “music” of the Atari 2600; and the development of a new lexicon for the 
emerging discipline of videogame studies. 
And that’s when it hit us both – hard.  People were actually talking about 
videogames the way we’d always wanted to hear them discussed.  I think Chris and I 
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have always known, deep down, there’s more to videogames than the popular media, 
behaviorist scientists – and indeed, most players – have realized.  But recognition was 
spreading, and quickly.  A discipline was emerging right in front of us.  In what could 
very easily have been representative of similar activity throughout the rest of the 
world, people from all camps – semioticians, narratologists, feminists, ludologists, 
media critics, journalists, artists – were converging in this tiny Princeton classroom.  
Graduate students of the Nintendo generation, not much older than Chris and me, 
packed the seats (and some presented papers), knowing what we knew, waiting like 
we were, for our intuitions to manifest.  Academics with a penchant for lengthy 
analyses and discourse about discourse about discourse sounded great, but in many 
ways they were restating what was obvious to the gameheads in the crowd.  
Videogames matter.  And they matter not only because they make lots of money in an 
age of so-called “new media”; they matter because people like Chris and I – and 
videogame players all over the world – know, without analysis, that they’re sites of 
meaningful interaction among people.  Playing videogames constitutes meaningful 
experience for and between human beings.  For this reason, the field of 
communication – which foremost maintains a rigorous exploration of the ways in 
which human beings create and share meaning in symbolic practice – is perfectly 
situated to enhance our understanding of videogames and the practice of 
videogaming. 
To say we gameheads at Princeton that day “knew” videogames are important 
is not to say we processed logically and rationally every argument from every pundit 
at every minute of lecture in order to arrive at a specific conclusion about games’ 
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potential.  To say we “knew” games are important is instead to say that at a gut level 
– at a very visceral and embodied level – our lived experience of videogaming was all 
we needed to conclude that something powerful happens when people play 
videogames, whether alone or with others.  When finished playing videogames, many 
gamers may feel (even if they don’t re-cognize it) something “there” that wasn’t there 
before.  Something is created.  Something happens.  I like to think we’re touched by 
the videogames we play – as we might be touched by a piece of music, getting 
gooosebumps upon hearing it; or by a novel, losing sleep when exploring its 
implications; or by a movie, crying at the outcome of the narrative.  Videogames 
might be “new” media, but they depend on a tried and true apparatus for their impact: 
the body.  Once we begin to consider the implications of being touched by the 
videogames we play – when we begin to theorize about the practice of videogaming 
at a point not of separation between body and game but rather one of mutual 
interdependence – entirely new ontological, epistemological, and axiological issues 
surrounding and arising from the meaningful experience of playing videogames 
become extraordinarily salient. 
Stuffed in tiny Princeton desk chairs, little did Chris and I know that the 
revolution had already begun in earnest a few years prior to our arrival at this 
conference.  In 2001, Espen Aarseth had already announced “year one of Computer 
Game Studies as an emerging, viable, international, academic field” (¶ 2).  He wrote: 
Today we have the possibility to build a new field.  We have a billion dollar 
industry with almost no basic research, we have the most fascinating cultural 
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material to appear in a very long time, and we have the chance of uniting 
aesthetic, cultural and technical design aspects in a single discipline. (¶ 9) 
What follows is a labor of love, spurred by that beautiful day in March 2004, 
by a conscientious and superb thesis committee, and by the unremitting lure of the 
videogame, which has given us so much to ponder. 
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Chapter 1 
A TYPOLOGY OF VIDEOGAME METATHEORY (SELECT PLAYER) 
 
Introduction 
“[. . .] It is very likely that future generations will use [computers] in their 
leisure time to interact with game playing programs.  The commercial profits 
of such entertainment could well exceed that of any ‘useful’ activity.” (Bell, 
1972, pp. 10-11) 
 
 We need to take videogames seriously. 
 Long considered “violent, addictive, childish [and] worthless” by “society” 
(Wright, 2006, p. 111), videogames are now emerging as powerful new media rife 
with social implications so pervasive they are becoming difficult to ignore.  Foremost, 
we might say videogames demand attention simply because of their social and 
commercial success.  For example, “Nolan Bushnell’s Computer Space brought him 
around $500 in royalties in 1971; a little over twenty years later, in 1992, the video 
game industry grossed over $5.3 billion, an increase of more than ten-million-fold” 
(Wolf, 2001, p. 5).  In 1999, the videogame industry generated $6.9 billion in the 
United States alone (Wolf, 2001); revenues skyrocketed to $27 billion in 2005 
(Grossman, 2006).  If the popularity of a medium can be inferred from its economic 
success, then we might consider videogames one of the most popular forms of 
entertainment media in the last decade.  Such success is not limited to the United 
States alone.  A 2005 study by the BBC found that 5.1 million individuals aged 16 to 
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24 played videogames with some degree of regularity.  This number increases to 6.7 
million among individuals aged 36 to 50 (BBC, 2005). 
 But apart from making money, videogames do much more.  Some argue 
videogames can provide insight into the nature of representational or cognitive 
processes (Gee, 2003; Myers, 2003).  Writers in both popular media and academic 
circles are debating fervently the role of videogames as aesthetic objects and art 
forms (Humble, 2006; Gee, 2006).  Videogames have prompted legal scholars to re-
evaluate law and policy in light of virtual game worlds’ intersections with traditional 
legislation (Lastowka, 2006), and have been identified as an ideal-type commodity in 
this era of post-Fordist economic systems, blending marketing, technology and 
culture in unparalleled ways (Kline et al, 2003).  Videogames blur lines dividing 
work and play (Yee, 2006; Kücklich, 2005), and they may potentially play a large 
role in adolescent male psychological development (Janz, 2005).  They might be a 
postmodern answer to the problem of the fragmented self in traditional, linear 
narrative (Ryan, 2001) – but then again, perhaps they are not, and should not be, 
anything of the sort (Aarseth, 2004). 
 Most importantly, we must take videogames seriously because they are rich 
sites of meaningful experience.  As “the first medium to combine moving imagery, 
sound, and real-time user interaction in one machine,” the videogame makes possible 
“the first widespread appearance of interactive, on-screen worlds in which a game or 
story [takes] place” (Wolf, 2001, p. 5).  Thus, as a cultural phenomena, videogames 
have profound implications for thinking and theorizing about our lived experience 
within a fundamentally media-ted existence.  Taking videogames seriously means 
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nothing less than augmenting current conceptualizations of our meaningful relations 
with others and interrogating the limits of body and world. 
 This study takes videogames seriously. 
Select Player 
 The practice of videogaming necessitates choice; videogaming is an 
engagement with media that thrusts choice to the forefront of experience.  Unlike 
traditional, linear media such as television and film – which require that viewers 
actively attend to their narratives as they unfold from beginning to end – videogames 
demand viewers become co-producers of the game text as they solve puzzles, juggle 
numerous variables, and master complex algorithms to continue the gaming 
experience (Wolf, 2001).  In this way, game player choice is key to the practice of 
videogaming, for it literally shapes the videogame text, the temporality and 
progression of which vary from play session to play session. 
 One of the text-shaping choices demanded by many videogames is “player 
selection.”  Present typically at the beginning of a game, and necessary to the 
continuation of the game text, this choice – wherein players are often required to 
choose among various avatar archetypes to represent them in the game world – can 
have profound effects on the nature and course of the ensuing game play experience.   
For instance, in a Tolkien-esque fantasy game, a player may be required to choose 
among wizard, dwarf or elf archetypal avatars for representation in the game world.  
Choice of one such avatar – and thus the declination of the others – will have 
profound repercussions that resonate across the entire scope of the game text, for each 
archetype is programmed with a unique set of variables.  Selecting the dwarf 
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archetype, for example, may allow players to wield certain items or weapons but find 
others unusable, practice one set of skills but remain ignorant of others, enter some 
game spaces but find others inaccessible, engage some game elements but ignore 
others.  In some cases, even the goals of the game may shift when a player chooses 
one archetype instead of another. 
In much the same way that those playing videogames make choices with 
profound implications for the eventual nature of the videogaming experience, those 
examining videogames must make an equally critical choice about the theoretical 
tools with which they will engage the research experience.  Currently, the field of 
videogame studies exhibits a rich, multi-disciplinary orientation to research and 
theorizing about an increasingly important practice.  Those turning toward 
videogames from a variety of disciplines and traditions operate with different goals, 
and with implicit presuppositions about the nature of videogames, the player, and 
videogaming as practice.  A particular set of theoretical tools may illuminate some 
opportunities while foreclosing others, articulate acutely some aspects of 
videogaming while superficially skimming the surface of others, observe quite clearly 
some aspects of videogaming but find others completely nonexistent. 
In what follows, I explicate the metatheoretical underpinnings of four 
predominant paradigms in the emerging field of videogame studies.1  This explication 
clears a space for thinking and theorizing about playing videogames as an embodied 
practice.  I will also provide brief examples of current research trends in each 
paradigm (or “perspective”).  Doing so warrants initial clarifications. 
 
 10
Defining Videogames 
 Various definitions of “videogame” abound.  Currently, “it is perfectly 
possible to conduct a thorough discussion of computer and videogames with no 
consensus as to precisely what forms, experiences, or technologies are under 
examination” (Newman, 2004, p. 10), but in the interest of expediency I will briefly 
outline a definition of “videogame.”  As most such definitions are lists of 
characteristics, I begin by considering two attempts to circumscribe an object of 
inquiry. 2  Newman (2004) adapts Howland’s (1998) description of the essential 
elements of a videogame, saying all videogames have five common components: 
graphics (images displayed on a screen while players “play” videogames), sound (any 
music or sound effects played during the game), interface (anything with which 
players are in direct contact in order to play a videogame – the term encompasses 
both hardware interface devices like controllers or software interface devices like on-
screen menu systems), gameplay (defined ambiguously as “how much fun a game is,” 
a game’s mechanics and its “immersive” qualities), and story (background 
information players gather before their actual engagement with the game as well as 
information players gather in-game – typically described in narrative fashion). 
 The nebulous “gameplay” element of the above description (which Newman, 
2004, regards as a “fuzzy term”) is an integral facet of any “videogame” definition, 
for it is a site at which we may most easily appreciate any embodied practices that are 
part of a player’s engagement with videogames.  This is to say, while “graphics” and 
“interface” are qualities intrinsic to the videogame (they are generally immutable in 
the hands of players, manipulated only by programmers and designers, and are pre-
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defined for players “out of the box”), “gameplay” instead explores what gamers do 
with games in the face of being told what they can do, how they use an interface, the 
ways in which rules become meaningful (in which games become “fun”), the manner 
in which graphical representations shape experience, and so forth.  Therefore, the 
“gameplay” element might best be concretized by research such as Jesper Juul’s – 
research whose focus is the videogame’s existence in relation to itself (as a set of 
rules), in relation to the player, and in relation to the larger symbolic practices and 
cultural circuits in which it is embedded (Juul, 2005).  In order to completely 
appreciate a videogame’s “gameplay,” I will adhere to Juul’s (2003; 2005) “classic 
game model,” which lists six necessary and sufficient elements for the presence of a 
game.  For further discussion of this model, including its origins, see this chapter’s 
section pertaining to ludology. 
According to this model, a game is 
1. a rule-based formal system; 
2. with variable and quantifiable outcomes; 
3. where different outcomes are assigned different values; 
4. where the player exerts effort in order to influence the outcome; 
5. the player feels emotionally attached to the outcome; 
6. and the consequences of the activity are optional and negotiable. (2006, 
pp. 6-7) 
 Infusing Newman’s definition with Juul’s model provides a working set of 
necessary conditions one might use to define “videogames” and differentiate them 
from other forms of interactive entertainment.  However, neither of these descriptions 
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attends sufficiently to the computerized nature of the videogame.  One should always 
remember that videogames invariably feature computerized components (typically 
designated as the “console” or simply the “hardware”) that render the graphics and 
sound integral to videogames, and that manage the complex sets of variables and 
rules that determine conditions for gameplay and story.  Juul (2005) observes: 
There appears to be a basic affinity between games and computers: Like the 
printing press and cinema have historically promoted and enabled new kinds 
of storytelling, computers work as enablers of games, letting us play old 
games in new ways, and allowing for new types of games that would 
previously not have been possible. (p. 5) 
Any serious study of videogames should not forget this fundamental material 
component of the phenomenon.  
Lexical Issues 
 In the early days of any discipline (such as the current state of videogame 
studies), questions of semantic specificity and lexical representation are important.  
For instance, Wolf and Perron (2003) note: 
While the term “electronic games” is so broad as to include any games that 
have an electronic component [. . .] the terms “video games” and “computer 
games” are more specific to the subject at hand; they are the terms most often 
used in popular and scholarly discourse. (p. 2) 
In other words, not all games with electronic components necessarily include “video” 
components; thus, not all electronic games are videogames.  The second term, 
“computer games,” is a popular alternative to “video games” because it references 
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specifically the inextricable, computerized component of the object of inquiry. 3  That 
is, “computer games” are a special kind of game in which complex graphical 
simulations, rules and variables can be managed by a computer system structuring the 
overall game system. 
 Throughout my work, I choose to use the term “videogames” to designate the 
object of inquiry.  Foremost, this term pays homage to a designation that emerged in 
popular discourse and has cultural recognition.  Also, the term “videogames,” written 
as a compound word rather than a noun modified by an adjective (“video games” or 
“computer games”), suggests a unique object worthy of its own label.  In this way, I 
agree with David Thomas (2005) who says the compound word “helps clarify the 
world of videogames as a certain type of game, and not just a qualified class of games 
like puzzle games or word games” (¶ 7).  While I certainly will not contend 
videogames share no commonalities with games in general (studying videogames is 
impossible without studying games in general, and this is why I take care to include 
Juul’s model in my definition of videogames), I also argue videogames are different 
enough to warrant a concrete term.  Where authors I reference and quote directly have 
used other terms to identify the object of inquiry, I leave these designations 
unchanged in deference to them. 
 Having made these distinctions and clarifications, I will proceed with a 
discussion of four predominant theoretical perspectives on videogames and 
videogaming. 
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The Traditional Perspective: 
Videogames as Mass Entertainment Media with Psychological Effects 
 Historically (that is, during the last three decades in which videogames have 
received notable, albeit meager, academic attention), videogames and the practice of 
videogaming have been forced into the same theoretical and methodological 
frameworks used to examine the psychological effects of mass media on individuals’ 
cognitive, emotional, physiological and behavioral states.  Indeed, under this 
umbrella, research about videogames can be seen as a subset of media effects 
research in general (Anderson & Dill, 2000).  Primarily, research of this nature has 
focused on two overarching themes: the effects of videogames on violent/aggressive 
behavior in adolescent males (Uhlmann & Swanson, 2004; Jansz, 2005; Williams & 
Skoric, 2005; Anderson, 2004) and gender portrayals in videogames and their related 
advertising (Scharrer, 2004). 
 This paradigm conceptualizes videogames as mass entertainment media with 
psychological effects.  Beyond this assumption, however, many traditional studies fail 
to specifically define or describe that which they consider a “videogame” (one 
notable exception is Jansz, 2005, who takes great care in appropriating Juul’s model 
when clarifying what will be considered a videogame).  One reason many traditional 
studies fail to elucidate specific definitions of their objects of inquiry may be that 
their work emerges from an era in which videogames were not taken seriously – that 
is, in which the formal, theoretical and structural specificities of videogames and their 
constitutive parts were not explored and described in great detail. 
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 Even so, while this paradigm subjects videogames to the same types of 
analyses TV and film have undergone, qualities setting videogames apart from these 
traditional media (namely, their interactive nature) have demanded new models and 
taxonomies from researchers operating from this perspective.  Videogames demand 
“active involvement of the user [. . .].  The active gamer stands in relative contrast 
with the consumers of television entertainment who can enjoy a program in a passive 
way if they like” (Jansz, 2005).  Film and television are “lean back media” according 
to Jansz because they are “generally less demanding and can be enjoyed rather 
passively” (p. 222).  Videogames, like novels, are conversely “lean forward media,” 
says Jansz (2005) because “their content comes into existence in response to the 
gamer’s efforts” (p. 222).  Simply put, the videogamer is “the ultimate case of the so-
called ‘active media user’ prominent in uses and gratifications theory” (Jansz, 2005, 
p. 222).  While the “leaning” distinction invokes references to the body, this 
perspective typically depicts players as “brains in a vat.”  It emphasizes the notion 
that players quickly and cognitively process information from games (which elicit 
emotions, according to Jansz, 2005), and then respond to those stimuli by way of 
subsequent motorized bodily mechanics (pressing buttons on a game controller).  The 
player is situated in a communicative, interactive relationship with the videogame, 
such that, according to Jansz (2005, p. 221), communication is the presence of a 
message (“When the player refrains from communicating, the game ceases to exist”) 
and interactivity is a frequent swapping of messages (“A video game requires a 
constant exchange of messages between the game and its player”).  As such, this 
tradition operates with conceptualizations of communication based on information 
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theory models (Deetz, 1994).  These models focus primarily on the deproblematized 
message as a synonym for communication, and they typically eschew talk of persons 
as anything but disembodied, decontextualized variables producing and exchanging 
messages as a way of reducing uncertainty about assumedly preformed ideas and 
common goals. 
Constituting the traditional perspective on videogames is what Mumby (1997) 
calls a “discourse of representation” (p. 4), a discourse in communication studies that 
can “be roughly characterized in terms of the positivist appropriation of Cartesian 
dualism” and is founded on “the radical (Cartesian) separation of subject (researcher) 
and object (of knowledge) and the development of research tools that allow this 
bifurcation to remain as inviolable as possible” (p. 4).  This bifurcation espoused by 
Cartesian thinking is also present in discourse about the relationship between player 
and videogame.  Studies operating from the traditional perspective on media effects 
are concerned primarily with identifying and predicting causal relationships between 
videogames as mass entertainment media and individuals.  This is to say, empiricist 
social science research on videogames examines the ways in which exposure to mass 
media messages influences individuals’ cognitive, behavioral or physiological states.  
For instance, a meta-analysis by Anderson and Bushman (2001) found that “exposure 
to violent video games increases aggressive thoughts, feelings, and behaviours, 
increases arousal, and decreases helping behaviour” (cited in Anderson, 2004).  
Moreover, several studies (Anderson, 2004; Anderson & Dill, 2000; Williams and 
Skoric, 2005) attribute the somewhat recent and urgent turn toward issues of 
videogame violence to the Columbine shootings.  After the April 20, 1999, incident, 
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investigations into the lives of shooters Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold found the two 
had frequently played the videogame Doom and customized several versions of the 
game to simulate what could be considered the real-world conditions of the eventual 
school shootings (Anderson & Dill, 2000).  This finding stoked interest in 
correlations between playing violent videogames and violent behaviors in adolescent 
males, and thrust videogame violence to the forefront of American consciousness.  
Participants who in a study by Yale psychologists Uhlmann and Swanson (2004) 
“played the bloody and violent video game Doom for 10 min [sic] subsequently 
associated the self more with aggressive traits and actions” (p. 49).  A sharp dualistic 
division between player and videogame is clear here, as the relationship between the 
two essentialist entities is one of causality and effectiveness. 
Useful for identifying this perspective are the methods its researchers typically 
employ to achieve such findings.  Many studies assess correlations between 
videogames and aggressive behavior by way of social-science experiments conducted 
in laboratory settings.4  Studies embracing the traditional perspective on quantitative 
content analysis, on the other hand, are concerned primarily with probabilities.  This 
is to say, empiricist content analyses involving videogames note the absence or 
presence of a particular common elements in media messages, as well as the 
frequency with which these elements are either absent or present.  For instance, a 
study examining videogame advertising frames its analysis of data via the following 
questions: “What percentage of ads for video games contains violent images? How 
frequently do violent words and phrases appear in the text?  What percentage of the 
ads contain sexual acts, words, or innuendos?  How frequently do video game ads use 
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fear, humor, or user identification appeals?” (Scharrer, 2004, p. 399).  Underpinning 
this method are presuppositions, held by representational theories, that media 
messages have universal and invariant effects, and that common elements have 
specific, rigid, unilateral meanings, and can be codified and classified by such. 
 Undoubtedly, the traditional approach to videogame research will continue 
unabated.  Recently, Jansz (2005) articulated what he expects to become “a model for 
the unfolding of emotion on violent video games” in research involving videogames’ 
effects on adolescent males (p. 219).  Herein, by way of scientific metaphors, 
videogames are depicted as “private laboratories” in which adolescent males – 
discouraged by social norms from overt public emotional experimentation – may 
deliberately and consciously negotiate identity construction during a notoriously 
turbulent period of their lives (p. 231).  “Within the virtual world of the game, gamers 
can enact, or perform, a particular identity in the most literal sense of the word” (p. 
231).  The appeal of violent games stems, for Jansz, from a desire to sate the curiosity 
that is part and parcel of physiological, emotional and psychological experimentation.  
Videogames are the compartmentalized, private laboratories in which such 
exploration is possible, as this new form of entertainment media constantly elicits 
emotions from players in a decontextualized, cognitive circuit of message production 
and exchange. 
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The Critical/Cultural Perspective: 
Videogames as an Articulation of Culture, Marketing and Technology 
The critical and cultural studies paradigm for the study of videogaming works 
to explicate ideologies implicit in game texts, expose power relations structuring the 
practice of videogaming, and offer subversive alternative performances or readings. 
A critical/cultural perspective on videogaming takes as its object of analysis 
the “gamework,” a neologism that is “conceptually reminiscent of Thierry Kuntzel’s 
‘film-work,’ which in turn harkens back Sigmund Freud’s ‘dream-work’” (Ruggill et 
al, 2004, p. 298).  Viewing videogames as gameworks is a way of abstracting them 
from their typical contexts as entertainment media and illuminating their signifying 
practices (Ruggill et al, 2004).  “Gamework,” however, is not synonymous with 
“videogame.”  Gamework and videogame share four components, according to 
Ruggill et al (2004, p. 298): 1) digital instructions that mediate interactions among 
players, such as rule sets, 2) the storage and processing components within which 
these instructions are executed, 3) the documentation and packaging that sell and 
explain game play, and 4) the player(s).  In addition to these qualities of a videogame, 
a gamework adds “critical consciousness about game production, distribution, and 
consumption” (p. 299).  In sum, “gamework” 
signifies much more than how people play in industrialized, computerized, 
capitalistic early twenty-first-century societies; it also embodies how they 
labor, relate to one another, and rest, as well as how they make sense of the 
present, remember the past, and imagine the future. (p. 299) 
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For Kline, Dyer-Witheford, and De Peuter (2003), videogames are an 
articulation of three circuits of interactivity – a cultural circuit, a technological circuit, 
and a marketing circuit.  In the cultural circuit “the game player is discursively 
positioned as a protagonist within a fictional scenario.  Here, we ‘read’ the video 
game as a semiotic apparatus that invites players to assume an imaginary identity, or, 
to use the more technical term, ‘interpellates’ them in a particular ‘subject-position’” 
(p. 53).  The technological circuit “involves the process of technological innovation 
and diffusion – the way inventions pass into popular use” (p. 55).  Finally, the 
marketing circuit examines “the interaction between marketers, commodities, and 
consumers” (p. 56).  These three circuits interlock to articulate videogames as a 
commodity exemplary of post-Fordist, information capitalism. 
Broadening the scope of videogame analysis in order to examine the 
interlocking circuits that give rise to the practice of videogaming allows for 
descriptions of the player as simultaneously 1) a player immersed in game text 
narratives pre-inscribed with culture-specific ideologies, 2) a user who interfaces with 
and demands ever-evolving videogame console technology, and 3) part of an 
increasingly specific consumer segment to whom videogames are marketed in a 
“hyper” fashion – that is, with increasing rapidity, heretofore unknown pervasiveness, 
and the integration of the consumer back into the process of production (Kline et al, 
2003, p. 295).  Particularly, a player is “playing” videogames in a space 
circumscribed by capitalist business practices. “Play” as a leisure activity has been 
commodified such that the boundaries between “player” and “consumer” are blurred; 
videogame manufacturers successfully create a need for expanded “play” time, then 
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provide goods necessary for filling that space – goods that are typically proscribed 
with or promote the norms and values of a dominant ideology or discourse 
(Humphreys, 2005).  “The paradox of information capitalism is that even as it 
encourages an expanded enclave of freedom and self-development of ‘pure play,’ it 
begins to undermine that enclave by commodifying it” (Kline et al, 2003, p. 245). The 
player is thus interpellated by the gamework, assuming a subject position pre-
inscribed in a version of the “playful” experience set forth by developers and 
manufacturers. 
This playful experience, when refracted through a critical lens, can in some 
ways be viewed as an act of “playbor,” as the player increasingly both plays and 
creates.  Indeed, some players describe their gameplay sessions with the same 
language with which they might describe the tedium of a full-time job (Yee, 2006). In 
some cases, players freely create additional game content typically usurped by game 
companies.  Highly relevant here is the notion of “modding,” or player-fan 
modification of a variety of game content that adds to the value of existing 
videogames – content such as additional game levels or avatars.  While modding is 
typically described as a “leisure” activity a player may undertake as an extension of 
play or as a “labor of love,” Kücklich (2005) notes that the unwaged creative labor of 
a multitude of modders “significantly reduces game developers’ R&D and marketing 
costs” (¶ 18).  “Hobbyists’ leisure work is converted from gift to commodity, what 
results is the circumvention of the initial investment risk for the commercial 
developers as the development work is transferred to the fan base where costs are 
negligible” (Postigo, 2003, p. 597).  In this way, the practice of videogaming serves 
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to successfully fold the player-as-consumer back into the ongoing game development 
process as player-as-producer.  This “playbor” has a “precarious” nature; it is 
voluntarily given and unwaged, as well as enjoyed and exploited (Kücklich, 2005; de 
Peuter & Dyer-Witheford, 2005). 
Another interesting twist on the notion of “playbor” is the realization that 
“productive players” in online multiplayer games (which allow thousands of players 
to interact with one another) actually produce and sustain the very social relationships 
integral to both the perpetual sale of a videogame title and relative success of that 
title.  As Humphreys (2005) explains, game developers can create the virtual “spaces” 
and “worlds” for players to inhabit, but the social relationships players form in those 
spaces are their own creations.  Social relationships are content, too – a type of 
player-produced content that developers recognize as imbued with the power to 
destroy a product (if players stop playing or stop working together, the game 
crumbles).  In this way, players can enact a bit of agency.  “Players in their 
passionate, voluntary, and willing participation hold particular kinds of power as well.  
The reliance of Sony and other game developers on player communities for content 
creation of various forms – both the tangible and the more intangible social forms – 
means they are subject to the goodwill of these player communities” (Humphreys, 
2005, p. 47).  Recognition that developers rely (to some extent) on players who 
generate integral game content can be a powerful tool in the hands of exploited 
players looking for subversive outlets.  Research regarding player-produced fiscal 
capital (Lastowka, 2006) and cultural capital (Malaby, 2006) is useful for exploring 
the increasingly interwoven nature of the “real world” and synthetic game worlds.5
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A critical perspective is often able to offer oppositional readings of game texts 
– readings that reframe the texts to expose ideological assumptions.  For instance 
Opel and Smith (2004), in their analysis of the Microsoft videogame ZooTycoon, 
reveal how a seemingly innocent game about creating and maintaining a zoo actually 
reinforces capitalist business strategy, turns wildlife and nature into spectacles, 
equates happiness with perpetual consumption, and “redirects environmental 
impulses back into the commodity form, replete with the classic tensions between 
labor and management” (p. 104).  In doing so, the game text positions a player-
subject as “zoo keeper and CEO [. . .].  Players must adopt a managerial perspective 
to balance the demands of a growing industry, in effect role-playing the process of a 
captain of industry” (p. 109).  Moreover, player-subjects embody “a sense of 
complete control over the environment – complete eco-dominance” (p. 115).  In sum, 
this oppositional reading of ZooTycoon reveals a game text that “encourages human 
expansion, monopolization of space, and creation of capitalist place. It subjugates 
wild animals as menial laborers for our own entertainment and suggests that 
manipulating the environment any way possible to achieve this is acceptable” (p. 
117).  Similarly, Schleiner (2001) offers several readings of popular female 
videogame protagonist Lara Croft – Croft as female Frankenstein monster, drag 
queen, dominatrix and femme fatale, positive role model, and vehicle for the queer 
female gaze – in order to “challenge given gender categories and adapt them to the 
diverse gender sensibilities of men, women, and others” (p. 225). 
By offering such subversive readings, the critical/cultural perspective 
illuminates the ideological underpinnings, larger social frameworks, and stratified 
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layers of power structuring the practice of videogaming.  Insofar as this tradition 
“challenges economistic explanations of capitalist relations of domination, and argues 
for a focus on the ‘superstructural,’ cultural, and ideological dimensions of power,” it 
can be situated in a larger communicative discourse, which Mumby (1997) calls “a 
discourse of suspicion” (p. 9).  This particular discourse draws upon Marxist thought 
and the work of the Frankfurt school, and constitutes a project of communication 
study whereby emancipation from dominant ideological frameworks for acting and 
the restoration of agency are placed center stage.  In so doing, a discourse of 
suspicion necessitates a view of communication as constitutive and emergent, rather 
than as instrumental and transmissional.6
The Ludological Perspective: 
Videogames as Formalized Simulations 
In 1998, Gonzalo Frasca resuscitated the term “ludology” to “refer to the yet 
non-existent ‘discipline that studies game and play activities’” (¶ 12), drawing on the 
Latin word for “game,” ludus.  Since his writing, however, the discipline of game 
studies (declared a discipline in 2001 by Espen Aarseth) has exploded and fractalized, 
and ludology is now but one perspective among many attempting to study 
videogames.7
Drawing upon semiotics (Lindley, 2005; re-tooled slightly by Frasca, 2003a, 
to form “simiotics” when studying simulations), cybernetics (Aarseth, 1997) and 
computer simulation theory (Frasca, 2003a), ludology is foremost concerned with the 
formal aspects of videogames (and games more generally).  Research taking this 
perspective attempts an ontology of videogames in order to 1) increase understanding 
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of games’ structures, 2) isolate necessary and sufficient elements that characterize 
games (particularly rules) and set them apart from other media (books, movies, etc.), 
and 3) create “typologies and models for explaining the mechanics of games” (Frasca, 
2003a, p. 222).  In examining videogames, researchers operating from this 
perspective might ask: What is a game?  What is a videogame, and how does it 
augment our current notions of games in general?  What are we doing when we “play 
games”?  What do games provide us?  Frasca does add this caveat to his explanation 
of ludology’s (current) purpose: 
However, formalism is not the flavor of the month in these posteverything 
times [. . .].  I personally see this structural approach as a first, necessary step 
in video game studies, which we will definitely outgrow once it helps us to 
better grasp the basic characteristics of video games. (p. 222) 
The first step in such a process of formalization would undoubtedly be 
shaping a definition of games.  Undertaking the task of locating this notoriously 
elusive definition, Juul (2003; 2005) has proposed a definition of games – a “classic 
game model” – consisting of six necessary and sufficient conditions that locate “the 
heart of gameness” (2003, p. 30).  Juul derives these conditions from a blend of game 
definitions and characterizations present in heretofore-sparse literature on the subject 
– definitions from Huizinga (1950), Caillois (1961), Crawford (1982) and others.  
This model has been discussed previously and has been appropriated for my purposes 
in this thesis project. 
The project of formalizing its object of inquiry is ongoing within the 
ludological community, but sufficient progress has been made such that I may 
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comment on this object here.  Just as the critical/cultural perspective takes a sort of 
“step back” from games to examine the socio-political forces swirling in, around, and 
through videogames, so, too, does the ludological perspective “back up” from 
videogames in order to examine not only the specific components and conditions 
necessary for the presence of a game, but also the interrelationships between these 
components (hence the perspective’s reliance on cybernetics).  Thus, ludologists’ 
examinations of what Eskelinen (2001; 2004) calls “the gaming situation,” are 
rigorous interrogations of complex sets of relations.  Says Eskelinen (2001): 
When discussing articulation, materiality, functionality, typology and 
orientation, among other things, we are confronting the bare essentials of the 
gaming situation: the manipulation or the configuration of temporal, spatial, 
causal and functional relations and properties in different registers. (¶ 3) 
For example, Eskelinen (2004) is able to formalize time in videogames by 
differentiating between “user time” and “event time” (between the actions of the 
player and the happenings of the game, respectively), and between the different 
durations, speeds, orders and frequencies of certain temporal phenomena in games (p. 
39).  He also formalizes relationships among a larger structure afforded by this 
“stepping back” from games to look at their “situations.”  By doing so, Eskelinen can 
map player-to-player, player-to-game, and game-to-world “articulations” (2001, ¶ 14-
17), and types of “relations” – spatial, temporal, causal and functional relations – 
present in gaming situations (¶ 17).  Indeed, the structure of time in videogames is a 
predominant research thread within the ludological community; more on this notion 
can be found in Lindley (2005), while Newman (2004) provides a succinct summary. 
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Another salient theme in ludological research is the interrelationship between 
notions of “play” and “game.”  Frasca (1998, 2003a) is currently most concerned 
about the difference between between the Latin ludus and the Greek paidia, or, 
roughly, between “game” and “play,” respectively.  These two phenomena, Frasca 
explains, are not mutually exclusive; games must be played in order to exist, and play 
is always structured by rules at even a very basic level (e.g., a child “playing doctor” 
is playing with a rule that states “we are not playing house”).  Moreover, a key 
difference between ludus experiences and paidia experiences might be their emphasis 
on quantifiable outcomes (Newman, 2004).  Therefore, videogames can be viewed as 
a dialectical manifestation, the convergence and result of both creativity and 
constraint.  Frasca’s (1998) examination of this dialectic allows him to produce 
typologies of rules. 
An exhaustive commentary on all formalized typologies advanced by 
ludologists like Eskelinen, Juul, and Frasca is certainly beyond the scope of the 
present research.  I have listed only a few of these classifications and formalizations 
as a way of illustrating both the purpose of research from a ludological perspective 
and the perceived object of analysis, the gaming situation. 
The ludological perspective has for some time been at odds with another 
perspective (to be adumbrated shortly): the narratological perspective.  In short, the 
narratological perspective argues that videogames are narrative devices and should be 
studied as literature, film, or any other narrative form.  Some ludologists are radically 
and vehemently opposed to the application of narratology to games (Aarseth, 2004; 
Eskelinen, 2004).  Others simply favor the ludological approach as a preferred 
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method amid a sea of valid ones (Juul, 2001; Frasca, 2003b), and note ways in which 
narrative elements are present in the otherwise ludological gaming situation.  As a 
way of both transitioning into an explication of the narratological perspective on 
videogaming and further clarifying the ludological position on the nature of 
videogames, I note here the key distinctions ludologists claim place videogames 
outside the scope of the narratological lens. 
Ludologists stress frequently the fact that games are simulations (Aarseth, 
2004; Eskelinen, 2004; Juul, 2001; Frasca, 2003a; Frasca, 2003b), or models of one 
(source) system through a different system that maintains (for somebody) some of the 
behaviors of the original system (Frasca, 2003a).  The type of signifying practice that 
seems to be at work here prompts Frasca to coin the term “simiotics” as a synthesis of 
both simulation and semiotics (2003a, p. 223).  By contrast, ludologists note (in line 
with some – but not all – narrative theorists) that narrative is representational; it “re-
presents” to an audience (or “user”) a fixed series of events that will always unfold 
the same way, and in the same order (i.e., a ludologists would note that every time 
one views Titanic, the ship always – and will always – sink at the film’s conclusion).  
Videogames – “the art of simulation” (Aarseth, 2004, p. 52) – are instead a “new 
mode of discourse” (p. 53), as simulation is the “hermeneutic Other” of narrative (p. 
52).  Aarseth also notes that games are merely context (sets of rules); videogames 
(and games in general) are not dually textual in and of themselves, even though 1) 
particular play sessions can be “read” post hoc, or 2) games can contain narrative 
elements (i.e., packaging and instructions) that stipulate simulation rules.  Simulations 
such as videogames require “input” from players to literally determine the form and 
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content of the videogame session, say ludologists, whereas traditional 
representational media simply provide “output” to be “read” by players.  Juul (2001) 
notes that novels have a determined state (they will unfold the same way each time), 
while games have a non-determined state.  Frasca (2003b) parses this slightly 
differently when he says persons presume a configurative role when playing 
videogames, and an interpretive role when reading novels and viewing films. 
And finally, as previously discussed, ludologists are particular about the 
notion of time in the gaming situation.  Time in games, according to Juul (2001), is 
quite different than time in narrative.  Narrative has both story time (the time of the 
thing told) and discourse time (the time of the telling of the thing); this distinction 
involves a “past” or “prior” (¶ 32).  Game time does not involve this distinction.  
According to Juul (2001): 
In this way, the game constructs the story time as synchronous with narrative 
time and reading/viewing time: the story time is now.  Now, not just in the 
sense that the viewer witnesses events now, but in the sense that the events are 
happening now, and that what comes next is not yet determined. (¶ 35) 
Key differences between the ludological perspective and the narratological 
perspective are more clear after the later perspective has been explained. 
The Narratological Perspective: 
Videogames as Game-Stories and Cyberdramas 
 Narratologists, literary theorists and critics, and film scholars draw upon a rich 
tradition of formal narrative studies when attempting to approach that which many 
consider a new and exciting form of narrative, storytelling, or drama.  Videogames as 
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interactive narratives could not have arrived at a better time, for, as Murray (2004) 
notes, “In a postmodern world [. . .] everyday experience has come to seem 
increasingly gamelike, and we are aware of the constructed nature of all our 
narratives” (p. 3).  A new storytelling device – one that allows for expression in line 
with contemporary recognition of the increasingly unstable, undetermined nature of 
reality – is necessary.  Narrative theory, say narratologists, can be expanded (Ryan, 
2001) to encompass this new device and explore new ways to narrate an increasingly 
non-linear, fragmented existence. 
 This is possible, according to Murray (2004), because “storytelling is a core 
human activity, one we take into every medium of expression, from the oral-
formulaic to the digital multimedia” (p. 3).  Because storytelling is literally a 
fundamental mode of human beingness, we can, in other words, presume the 
applicability of narrative theory to videogames.  In short, “games are always already 
narrative systems” (Zimmerman, 2004, p. 163) because human nature constructs them 
as such without our having anything to say about the matter.  Seen through this lens, 
then, videogames, as an object of analysis, become story-games (the fact that “story” 
precedes “game” is deliberate and key), or “cyberdramas,” which are enactments of a 
story in the fictional space of the computer (Murray, 2004). 
 Understanding the ways narratologists define narrative, story and storytelling 
are imperative to understanding the narratological perspective on the practice of 
videogaming.  Ryan (2001) defines narrative as 
A sign with a signifier (discourse) and a signified (story, mental image, 
semantic representation).  The signifier can have many semiotic 
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manifestations.  It can consist for instance of a verbal act of story-telling 
(diegetic narration), or of gestures and dialogue performed by actors (mimetic, 
or dramatic narration). (¶ 6) 
Narrative from this perspective consists of particular elements – a world 
(setting), situated in time, populated by individuals (characters), who participate in 
actions and happenings (events, plot) and undergo change (Ryan, 2001).  Also in this 
sense, a story is an experience of narrative (Zimmerman, 2004).  Videogames contain 
these elements and, as Ryan (2001), Murray (2004), and Turkle (2003) have shown, 
twist them in novel and insightful ways.  Players experience the unfolding of 
videogame narratives such that they find themselves in a situation similar to a 
storytelling session. 
In conjunction with these elements, the “formalized” components of the 
ludologists are typically cited by narratologists as renamed narrative devices.  For 
instance, games contain an element of problem-solving, as players learn to navigate 
novel, rule-bound structures and achieve goals.  Narratives, too, contain an element of 
problem-solving, as players anticipate narrative plot twists, solve puzzles presented 
by the narrative, and attempt to actively make sense of the narrative as it unfolds.  
“The most prominent reason for acting in life is problem solving.  It is therefore the 
most fundamental narrative pattern” (Ryan, 2001, ¶ 6).  Likewise, as games (as 
defined by Juul’s classic game model) consist of sets of rules that define what can 
and cannot be done in the game, as well as what outcomes are desirable, narratives 
are driven similarly by a “moral physics,” or ideological, social “rules” garnered from 
narrative experience (Murray, 2004) – rules that constitute game choices and player 
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actions as desirable and appropriate.  Videogame designers wittingly or unwittingly 
“code” games with a moral physics, and players bring their socialized sets of rules to 
each videogaming session when reading an unfolding narrative and acting in 
gameworlds. 
“Bringing” sets of social rules to gaming situations underscores this 
perspective’s view of the nature of narrative as a sort of gestalt underpinning our 
everyday practices.  This is to say, this perspective would note all persons as acting in 
accordance with perceived narrative forms – not “seeing” the world but “seeing it as 
narrative.”  Both expression and perception are thus constituted in, through, and by 
narrative.  Because of this, narratological analysis of videogame texts is not confined 
to games’ actual gameplay.  For instance, Zimmerman’s (2004) reading of Ms. Pac-
Man accounts for more than just that which takes place on the screen: 
Large-scale characters on the physical arcade game cabinet establish a 
graphical story about the chase between Ms. Pac-Man and the ghosts.  There 
are also brief noninteractive animations inside the game, which appear 
between every few levels [. . .].  It’s a narrative about life and death, about 
consumption and power.  It’s a narrative about strategic pursuit through a 
constrained space, about dramatic reversals of fortune where the hunter 
becomes the hunted.  It’s a narrative about relationships, in which every 
character on the screen, every munchable dot and empty corridor, are 
meaningful parts of a larger system.  It’s a narrative that always has the same 
elements, yet unfolds differently each time it is experienced. (p. 162) 
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Ms. Pac-Man – or any videogame, for that matter – is thus much more than the stories 
of our gaming experiences we retell after playing.  Instead, the videogame is itself an 
intertextual phenomenon: 
The player’s experience of the game-story is composed of the entire arcade 
game.  This includes [. . .] the cabinet graphics and the cartoon animations, the 
sound of the quarter dropping and the texture of the joystick, the social and 
architectural dynamics of the arcade itself, the gender ideologies of the game 
and its historical relationship to the original Pac-Man, the marketing of the 
character and its penetration into pop culture at large. (p. 162) 
Close readings like Zimmerman’s are meant to explicate videogames’ intertextual 
signifying structures and to expose the hermeneutic interplay of story and game that 
mark videogames as a new, compelling medium for storytelling. 
In the meantime, several writers have recently begun outlining “compromises” 
between narratological and ludological perspectives on videogaming, noting, as 
Jenkins (2004) does, that videogames are actually cocktails of ludological and 
narratological elements.  Game designers are “narrative architects” (p. 129) who 
create game spaces before they tell stories or formalize rules.  Narrative is a 
consequence of game-space design, as the space “can either enhance our sense of 
immersion within a familiar world or communicate a fresh perspective on [a] story 
through the altering of established details,” become “a memory palace whose contents 
must be deciphered as the player tries to reconstruct the plot trajectory,” and enable 
“story-constructive activities of players” (p. 129).  Newman (2004) also discusses 
numerous perspectives on videogame spaces.  As narrative architects, game designers 
 
 34
use narrative as a “hook” into a game’s space, to detail a player’s goals while playing, 
and to set game rules.  Frasca (2003b) has also attempted to bridge the schism that 
seems to have opened between ludologists and narratologists, a schism he says never 
really existed in the first place, as ludologists have always “made room” in their 
analyses for games’ narrative elements. 
Criticism and Conclusion 
I wish to return briefly to my initial metaphor, which linked the moment of 
character selection in videogames to the moment of perspective selection for research 
on videogames.  We should remember: neither the choice between character 
archetypes in videogames nor the selection of a perspective in videogame studies is a 
qualitatively “good,” “bad,” “right,” or “wrong” choice.  Such choices simply and 
simultaneously uncover, reveal, obfuscate, constitute, and preclude facets, features, 
characteristics and components of videogames themselves, the videogaming 
experience, and the practice of videogaming. 
The four aforementioned perspectives are fruitful; they offer a deeper, richer 
understanding of the videogame phenomenon – albeit from different trajectories and 
with different metatheoretical, presuppositional paradigm sets.  However, none of 
these perspectives addresses the notion of the body in a way that enriches 
understanding of the lived experience of playing videogames. 
The traditional perspective decontextualizes the practice of videogaming. 
Such decontextualization is slightly disconcerting from a standpoint more concerned 
with communication as an embodied event-process.  Players’ physical bodies are 
glaringly absent from analyses couched in this perspective; instead, the traditional 
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perspective’s purely cognitive focus relegates the body to a mechanistic role.  This is 
to say, the body is merely a machine, a mere scaffolding, through which the brain’s 
commands are executed, or through which cognitive/emotional states generated in the 
“black box” of the mind are made manifest in observable behavior. 
The critical/cultural perspective’s perceptual shift affords inquiry into the 
material and discursive structures that shape the practice of videogaming.  While its 
emphasis on materiality and the production of inhabitable subject positions is a 
welcome and fruitful paradigm shift in videogame studies, this perspective’s relative 
silence about the bodies actually engaging and producing these material conditions – 
about the embodiment of discursively produced subject positions – does not provide a 
holistic understanding of videogaming as an embodied practice. 
The formal, structural ludological perspective, collapses the player into the 
cybernetic gaming situation; the player becomes, at times, an over-rationalized 
element in this burgeoning topological matrix of game components.  The player is not 
omitted from ludological research; indeed, Eskelinen (2001) is very precise in 
outlining temporal relations a player can occupy in the gaming situation (static 
temporal, dynamic temporal, static spatial, and temporal spatial).  But in a 
traditionally cybernetic fashion, the player becomes almost as rational as the 
computer system managing a videogame’s complex rules and variables, and some of 
the so-called “free-form” paidia experience seems to slip by the wayside. 
Clarifications about the nature of time in videogames, such as Juul’s (2001), 
are common sites of antagonism between ludologists and narratologists; however, the 
debate seems to stem unnecessarily from a conceptualization of narrative 
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performance that posits sharp divides between subject and object, past and present, 
storyteller and audience, etc.  Both ludologists and narratologists seem to place 
emphasis on the nature of the essential object – e.g., it is the videogame that 
purportedly “tells” the story or does not “tell the story,” because it is either essentially 
a narrative device or it is not.  This view, however, disembodies the videogame, 
locating it “outside” the player and the player’s embodied experience.  This is evident 
in the way ludologists and narratologists typically talk about “players” and “readers” 
acting on the game or text, or the ways in which the game/text does something to the 
reader or user, like tell a story to him or her.  If we consider, however, the practice of 
videogaming as an inherently embodied one – whereby any narrative constituted as 
part of the gaming situation is not “in” the game or “from” the player after she or he 
concludes playing but rather as part of an overall productive, transformative, 
emergent process – the result of which is a meaningful communication event – then 
the necessity of such subject/object, inside/outside, player/game (and, as we shall 
soon see, reader/audience) dichotomies is essentially rendered useless. 
Finally, as is quite evident by now, the narratological perspective on 
videogaming is rooted firmly in a structuralist literary tradition.  Herein, elements of a 
narrative situation – such as reader, text, method and reading – can be analyzed 
individually and as they interlock but remain fairly discrete.  By shifting theoretical 
traditions to assume a poststructuralist undertaking, however, the four aforementioned 
components of the narrative situation – which constantly make appearances in 
narratological research on videogaming – collapse “into a continuous act in which 
discourse reproduces itself” (Tompkins, 1988, p. 747).  The site of such discursive 
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reproduction is the body.  Collapsing the boundaries keeping components of the 
storytelling situation relatively discrete allows storytelling to emerge as a 
communicative practice that “draws the audience and storyteller, and the order of 
experience and the order of analysis, into connection by transforming one into the 
other and vice versa” (Peterson & Langellier, 2005, p. 128).  Narrative performance, 
in other words, is not only post hoc, like Aarseth (2004) may claim, but also 
constitutes the very nature of the videogame to begin with (games must be played, 
and play is an embodied activity).  “The doubled message of telling a story and the 
story of the telling finds correspondence in a split between an implied ‘you’ in the 
story and the ‘you’ that is a reader [. . .] and between storytelling as true and 
storytelling as fictive” (Peterson & Langellier, 2005, p. 129).  The time of the telling 
and the time of the thing told – temporal distinctions typically invoked, if we recall, 
by ludologists such as Juul (2001) and narratologists such as Ryan (2001) – are 
collapsed into a gaming situation whose “thing-ness” merely emerges (and can only 
emerge) from its being played.  The practice of videogaming is best studied as an 
embodied praxis of videogaming rather than a somewhat essentialist investigation of 
the “nature” of a disembodied videogame telling stories (or, for that matter, not 
telling stories). 
An embodied perspective on the communicative practice of videogaming can 
enrich the metatheoretical dialogue already ongoing in a field of study bursting with 
interdisciplinary relevance and widespread personal, social and cultural promise.  I 
am not the first to point out the dearth of research on videogames from an embodied 
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perspective.  However, attempts to recover the body in videogame analysis assume a 
wide variety of occasionally disparate approaches. 
From the standpoint of cognitive psychology, Grodal’s (2003) “embodied 
brain” approach is a radical reorientation; Grodal not only re-centers videogame 
analysis on the body, but also discredits immensely any kind of symbolic analysis, 
writing “[. . .] cognitive psychology provides many advantages as a tool for 
describing video games compared with a semiotic approach; even if games may be 
provided with some symbolic signs, most of the game activity consists in seeing, 
hearing and doing in a simulation of a real-world interaction” (p. 130).  He proceeds: 
“Many language-based story-descriptions have derailed descriptions of video games 
(and films) because they ignore the fact that semantic meaning is based on concrete 
perceptions and motor patterns, not on some abstract ‘semantics,’ kept in place by 
verbal signifiers” (p. 133).  Grodal’s focus on innate, hardwired, deep-structure 
storytelling mechanisms in the embodied brain is meant to account for the nonverbal 
processes involved in videogame playing; unfortunately, communication research 
such as the present thesis cannot operate exclusively at such a micro/biological level.  
The body is indeed the primordial ground for any kind of “verbal signifier” or sign-
vehicle, but understood in terms of lived experience the body’s activity refuses to be 
reduced to the mere sum of its micro-mechanical movements. 
Other embodied perspectives on videogames and videogaming operate from a 
psychoanalytic perspective, whereby the role of the body becomes almost 
interchangeable with that of the on-screen avatar in a synthetic game world.  Rehak 
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(2003) describes this relationship as a “linkage” where the avatar is a “stand-in” for 
the player (p. 107): 
“The video game avatar would seem to meet the criteria of Lacan’s objet petit 
a.  Appearing on screen in place of the player, the avatar does double duty as 
self and other, symbol and index.  As self, its behavior is tied to the player’s 
through an interface (keyboard, mouse, joystick); its literal motion as well as 
its figurative triumphs and defeats, result from the player’s actions.  At the 
same time, avatars are unequivocally other.  Both limited and freed by 
difference from the player, they can accomplish more than the player alone; 
they are supernatural ambassadors of agency.” (p. 106) 
Playing videogames is a pleasurable activity for players who enjoy the control 
associated with the avatar’s “reflection” of “embodied reality” (p. 107).  
Psychoanalysis is a useful method for studying videogames – one whose implications 
have not yet been fully explored – however, its scope is limited to relationships 
among subjective ego-player, objectified avatar, and their binding gaze. 
 An attempt to account for the embodied player and its relationship to an on-
screen avatar not grounded in psychoanalysis is Fisler’s (2006) theory of the 
“performed player.”  Fisler argues videogaming should be understood not as direct 
involvement, nor as passive performance, but as mediated interaction between digital 
representations and organic activity. On-screen “digital extensions” of the player 
(Fisler rejects the term “avatar” for etymological reasons) are sites of ego projection, 
onto which players project culturally and personally favorable qualities in a process 
of idealization.  Fisler’s conceptual move to bridge notions of the “organic” body 
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with those of digitized, representational space indicate a welcome paradigm shift in 
videogame studies.  However, the theory’s ability to account for videogames with no 
strong avatarial presence – videogames such as Tetris – remains uninterrogated. 
 Finally, another notable attempt at accounting for the body in videogame 
studies involves the appropriation of cyborg theory.  Lahti (2003) directly attacks the 
transcendental nature of many techno-futurist arguments regarding videogames’ 
immersive qualities, stating, “[. . .] games actually anchor our experience and 
subjectivity firmly in the body or in an ambiguous boundary between the body and 
technology” (p. 158).  Moreover, videogames “challenge us to rethink audiovisual 
theories that have regularly articulated media spectatorship as a passive process that 
dematerializes the body and foregrounds a psychic or cognitive experience” (p. 169).  
I agree with Lahti (2003): the practice of videogaming resonates with a certain set of 
“carnal pleasures” the discipline of videogame studies has quite insufficiently 
explored because it fails to recognize that “if something is left behind when we play, 
it is not the body.  We may be toying with the body when we play, but we remain 
flesh as we become machines” (Lahti, 2003, p. 169).   With this sentiment in mind, I 
wish to proceed with a discussion of phenomenology’s valuable contribution to the 
study of videogames and the practice of videogaming. 
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Chapter 2 
EIDETIC PHENOMENOLOGY AS METHOD 
 
Introduction 
In the first chapter of this thesis, I adumbrate four predominant perspectives 
on videogames and the practice of videogaming (while offering an overview of 
current research trajectories), comment on the implicit or explicit position of the body 
from each perspective, indicate a need for videogame research that makes 
embodiment its focal point, and trace briefly a few recent attempts to account for the 
body in such research. In order to re-center videogame analysis at the site of the body, 
this study asks: What is the role of the body in players’ experiences of videogames 
and the practice of videogaming?  And more specifically: how does the body function 
as a material locus wherein the reversibility of expression and perception is made 
manifest in the event-process of communication? 
The present research is an investigation of videogames’ communicative 
capacities – that is to say, the ways videogames function in relation to expression and 
perception, in enabling and constraining symbolic practices, and in facilitating action 
between and among bodies.  It contributes to the communication discipline an avenue 
for further research regarding an increasingly prolific cultural (and intercultural) 
phenomenon. 
Moreover, this project contributes to the discipline of videogame studies a set 
of theoretical tools useful for interrogating players’ lived experiences of the practice 
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of videogaming – an interrogative effort largely ignored in contemporary videogame 
studies.  Exploration of such lived experience is possible in and with phenomenology. 
Quite simply, phenomenology is that philosophical movement concerned with 
the embodied, material subject’s lived, conscious experience in inextricable (and thus 
necessarily situated) relation to the world.  This chapter unpacks this parsimonious 
definition of phenomenology, demonstrates phenomenology’s usefulness in 
communication research and the study of videogames as sites of meaningful 
experience, and outlines the specific ways in which this study brings 
phenomenological method to bear on a videogame in order to exhibit videogames’ 
communicative capacities. 
Existential Phenomenology 
“ [. . .] Phenomenology can be practiced and identified as a manner or style of 
thinking [. . .] it existed as a movement before arriving at a complete 
awareness of itself as a philosophy.” (Merleau-Ponty, 2005, p. viii) 
 
 With the maxim “To the things themselves!” phenomenology’s founder, 
Edmund Husserl, stressed the need for a philosophy whose methods, unlike the 
natural science’s explanatory or analytical routines, were essentially descriptive.  
Phenomenology would attempt “to gain knowledge of invariant structures of 
consciousness” (Polkinghorne, 1983, p. 203), and to investigate the ways in which 
human lived reality and understanding are constituted – the ways in which “the 
spectrum of experience is organized into units and recognizable wholes” 
(Polkinghorne, 1983, p. 204).  To say phenomenology’s methods are descriptive of 
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“lived reality” is to note the movement’s interest in undercutting a predominant, 
positivistic attitude seeking causal explanations for “reality itself” or an objective 
reality outside the body’s placement in it.  According to Verbeek (2005): 
“Husserl asked himself what is really given to human beings when they 
address themselves to the world.  In answering this question, he found first of 
all that he had to suspend the ‘natural’ attitude in which human beings assume 
that what is given to them corresponds to a world outside of them, or to an 
order fully articulated by reason.” (p. 109) 
In other words, Husserl’s phenomenology was a rejection of a natural science interest 
in discovering universal, causal laws governing all human experience.8
 Husserl’s particular strand of phenomenology – now often called 
“transcendental phenomenology” because of Husserl’s interest in locating a “true 
reality” unknowable through scientific explanation and locatable by stepping outside 
or above experience in order to analyze it (see Ihde, 1977, for a complete excursus of 
this logic) – has undergone numerous revisions since its initial articulation.  In the 
hands of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, one of Husserl’s most notable students, 
phenomenology took what is now known as an “existential” turn.  My work utilizes 
this existential strand of phenomenology. 
 Eschewing the notion of consciousness as that which transcends ordinary 
experience – as something outside or above or apart from everyday involvement with 
the world – Merleau-Ponty instead recognizes the undeniable interrelatedness of 
subject and object, the mutually constitutive relations of person and world, the 
permeability of boundaries both separating and conjoining inside and outside, and, 
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thus, the always-embodied situation of the mind. “Merleau-Ponty begins with the 
negative claim that the body is not an object.  It is the condition and context through 
which I am able to have a relation to objects.  It is both immanent and transcendent” 
(Grosz, 1994, p. 86).  Conscious experience is always embodied – always grounded 
in corporeal, sensory relations.  “Indeed, existential phenomenology is 
philosophically grounded on the carnal, fleshy, objective foundations of subjective 
consciousness as it engages and is transformed by the world” (Sobchack, 2004, p. 2).  
Merleau-Ponty’s (1964c) emphasis on embodiment marks his philosophy as a 
rejection of either/or dualism, “going against doctrines which treat perception as a 
simple result of the action of external things on our body as well as against those 
which insist on the autonomy of consciousness” (pp. 3-4).  Instead, “embodiment is a 
radically material condition of human being that necessarily entails both the body and 
consciousness, objectivity and subjectivity, in an irreducible ensemble” (Sobchack, 
2004, p. 4). 
A focus on embodiment thus necessarily recognizes one’s both being a body 
and having a body; it recognizes “the lived body as, at once, both an objective subject 
and a subjective object: a sentient, sensual, and sensible ensemble of materialized 
capacities and agency that literally and figurally makes sense of, and to, both 
ourselves and others” (Sobchack, 2004, p. 2, emphasis in original).  According to 
Grosz (1994): 
Although the body is both object (for others) and a lived reality (for the 
subject), it is never simply object nor simply subject.  It is defined by its 
relations with objects and in turn defines these objects as such – it is “sense-
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bestowing” and “form-giving,” providing a structure, organization, and 
ground within which objects are to be situated and against which the body-
subject is positioned. (p. 87) 
The body’s historical and cultural situatedness is also an important consideration for 
existential phenomenology.  Phenomenological inquiry “focuses on the phenomena of 
experience and their meaning as spatially and temporally embodied, lived and valued 
by an objective subject – and, as such, always already qualified by the mutable 
specificities and constraints of history and culture.  In this sense embodiment is never 
a priori to historical and cultural existence” (Sobchack, 2004, p. 2). 
Merleau-Ponty pushed this radical, existential line of thought furthest in The 
Visible and the Invisible, a work left incomplete upon his death in 1961.  Therein, 
Merleau-Ponty described the notion of the flesh.  The flesh “is not matter” (Merleau-
Ponty, 1968, p. 146) but rather “the common existential ground of both body and 
world that is the general medium or ‘element’ of materiality” (Sobchack, 2004, p. 
286), or “a condition of both seeing and being seen, of touching and being touched, 
and of their intermingling and possible integration, a commonness in which both 
subject and object participate, a single ‘thing’ folded back on itself” (Grosz, 1994, p. 
95).  Merleau-Ponty (1968) writes  
[The flesh] is the coiling over of the visible upon the seeing body, of the 
 tangible upon the touching body, which is attested in particular when the body 
 sees itself, touches itself seeing and touching the things, such that, 
 simultaneously, as tangible it descends among them, as touching it dominates 
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 them all and draws this relationship and even this double relationship from 
 itself, by dehiscience or fission of its own mass. (p. 146) 
The flesh names the reversible relation between subject and object, body and 
world, and is thus a manifestation in existence of chiasm, another notion Merleau-
Ponty addresses in his later work.  According to Sobchack (2004), chiasm “is used to 
name the ground of all presence against which discrete figures of being emerge as 
such; it is thus the ground from which oppositions both emerge and fall away, in 
which they become reversible but noncoincidental” (p. 294). 
Chiasm and its manifestation in existence, the flesh, offer foremost novel 
bases for communication study.  If we begin analysis from the depths of the chiasm – 
from a point not of mutual exclusivity of self and other, of inside and outside, but 
rather of their essential and inextricable reversibility and interconnectedness – then 
we open a space for thinking and theorizing about human interaction that jettisons 
outmoded “theories” of communication couched in dualistic, empiricist, message-
centered metatheory typically resonant with no-body.  Merleau-Ponty (1968) appears 
to think through the implications of chiasm for human communication in working 
notes included as part of the unfinished The Visible and the Invisible.  He writes, 
“The chiasm is not only a me[-]other exchange (the messages he receives reach me, 
the messages I receive reach him), it is also an exchange between me and the world, 
between the phenomenal body and the ‘objective’ body, between the perceiving and 
the perceived [. . .]” (p. 215).  As Self and Other constitute “core concerns” from 
modern and postmodern perspectives, respectively (Lanigan, 2000), existential 
phenomenology and its emphasis on the already-imbricated state of these phenomena 
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– not only in purely interpersonal terms but also in more general terms of the material 
body’s situated relations with objects in the world9 – is indeed a powerfully relevant 
philosophy for exploring the meaningful practices in which humans engage. 
 Existential phenomenology also has significant implications for the emerging 
field of videogame studies, as videogames and the practice of videogaming are the 
very symbolic sites at which the philosophy operates productively.  Phenomenology’s 
“manner or style of thinking” allows us to conceptualize videogames as fleshy-things, 
their hardware interfaces and digitally synthetic worlds grounded in the “selfsame 
flesh” of the bodies that engage them (Sobchack, 2004, p. 287).  Each videogame 
inserted into a console can open a novel alterity for our eventual enfolding, a mode of 
relations with the “virtual” that says more about our carnal, fleshy, immanent 
inhabitance of the everyday material world than the disembodied, fetishized, utopian, 
transcendent world of the cyberpunk.  And what is more: while the study of 
videogames is indeed an investigation of the limits between body and world, we 
should never forget videogames’ role, too, as playful sites of coordinated, meaningful 
action between human beings. 
Eidetic Phenomenology as Method 
 Merleau-Ponty also provides phenomenologists with a specific method by 
way of which phenomenological research may proceed.  According to Lanigan (1988) 
this phenomenological method is “both systematic and systemic” (p. 173); this is to 
say, while its three distinct steps proceed in a specified, systematic order, they 
synergistically and systemically draw upon one another at all phases of the research 
procedure. 
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 This method begins with a phenomenological description, “which for 
Merleau-Ponty is a focus upon experience” (Lanigan, 1988, p. 173).  As 
phenomenology is essentially descriptive, this step is important for data collection.  
Data, produced in hindsight, is “that which is given as evidence or invention” 
(Lanigan, 1992, p. 215, emphasis in original).10 Phenomenological description is 
rigorous and intricate, as it involves intense focus on that which is typically taken for 
granted.  According to Sobchack (2004): 
Direct experience is not so much direct as it is transparent – either because we 
are primarily intending toward the world and our projects and not toward our 
modes and process of perception and expression or because we are historically 
and culturally habituated so that what is given to us in experience is taken for 
granted rather than taken up as potentially open engagement with the world 
and others.” (p. 5) 
The second step of Merleau-Ponty’s method is the phenomenological 
reduction, which Lanigan (1988) identifies as “a specification of experience in 
consciousness” (p. 173).  Especially important during this phase of the 
phenomenological method is the notion of intentionality, one of phenomenology’s 
most widely recognized contributions to philosophic thought.  Intentionality names 
the taken-for-granted relation between consciousness and world, whereby both are 
literally constituted in the acts of perception and expression (all consciousness is 
consciousness of something, to use Husserl’s famous summation).  The reduction 
phase of the phenomenological method, then, is characterized by a focus on capta, 
“that which is taken as evidence or discovery” (Lanigan, 1992, p. 215, emphasis in 
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original).  We may consider this phase insight-full, as salient experiences manifest in 
and to consciousness from a horizon or field of all possible, describable phenomena.  
“In [. . .] intentional analysis, attention is given to a particular experience in which the 
various structures and modes of consciousness that have been synthesized to 
constitute it are analyzed and descriptively explained” (Polkinghorne, 1983, p. 205).  
The systemic nature of data and capta is evident here, as capta – or “a seeing as” – is 
intertwined with the collection of data from a field of possible experiences. 
Merleau-Ponty’s final methodological phase is the phenomenological 
interpretation, also known as the hermeneutic step (Lanigan, 1988; Ihde, 1977).  Here 
phenomenologists attempt to gain foresight – to produce acta, that which is done, or 
“that which is created as evidence either by convention or invention” (Lanigan, 1992, 
p. 215, emphasis in original).  Systemically, the data-capta relationship dialectically 
produces an acta-based orientation toward the world.  “The existential-
phenomenological (descriptive) system of inquiry investigates the various structures 
of orientation toward the world which make up human experience” (Polkinghorne, 
1983, p. 205).  Recursively, then, all interpretative acta become data for further, 
future analysis. 
This methodology is truly productive in the sense that it is deconstructive.  As 
Lanigan (1994) notes, the phenomenological paradigmatic approach to research 
properly distinguishes between the encounter with evidence as it appears to 
consciousness (the order of experience) and the method of experiencing the evidence 
(the order of analysis).  This is to say, while lived experience unfolds as an 
experiencer experiences an experience, analysis of this experience (if it is to be 
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critical and heuristic) should trace such a progression backward, beginning with lived 
experience (described as data) and tracing its processual constitution (as capta) to 
consciousness of the experiencer (when it is interpreted as acta).  Conversely, 
reductionist, modernist (i.e., positivist) approaches to research assume “that the order 
of experience (OE) and the order of analysis (OA) are parallel orders of judgment” 
(Lanigan, 1994, p. 115).  In sum: 
The phenomenologist is moving (OE) from her/his experience (“observation”) 
to discover a phenomenon in consciousness (“measurement”) and then back as 
a judgment using the very discovered logic of the phenomenon in which the 
researcher’s consciousness of the phenomenon (OA) is a measure of the 
observation (experience).  Only by starting with the OE and reversing it as the 
OA can the researchers be guaranteed of both accuracy and abstraction in 
description (depiction). (Lanigan, 1994, p. 112) 
 The phenomenology enacted in this thesis project will be an eidetic 
phenomenology.  While Lanigan (1992) initially defines “eidetic” as “thinking” (p. 
212), he also notes that the term indicates “a conceptual or ideational process” (p. 
212).  Eidetic phenomenology foregrounds intentional “consciousness of” when 
“making sense” of phenomena as they appear to consciousness (Lanigan, 1992, p. 
212), and when moving toward a “concern with structures or invariants” (Ihde, 1977, 
pp. 60-61).  Eidetic theory construction is “tested reflexively” against empirically 
derived experience (Lanigan, 2002, p. 213). In the case of an eidetic phenomenology, 
phenomenological interpretation informs theory construction. 
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 That which phenomenology produces is, of course, one possible experiential 
variation among many.  Phenomenology “is methodologically descriptive and 
legitimates the knowledge of the subject while pointing out the critical possibilities 
that result from the subject’s negotiation with the world” (Rubin, 1998, p. 267).  
Thus, while my body allows certain experiential possibilities to open for me, my body 
is at the same time necessarily particularized such that it facilitates one variation in a 
range of possible experiences.  I may indicate the presence of these variations as I 
proceed through this experiment.  The body “exists in order that the world exists for 
me.  But also this body exists according to particulars – this body is sexed, muscular, 
dark” (Rubin, 1998, p. 268).  My body is male; my body is white; my body is young; 
my body is disciplined by the socioeconomics of the American middle class.  I can 
but experience the world by way of this body.  These and other bodily conditions for 
my being-in-the-world are laid bare in Chapter 3. 
Others undertaking this same project will undoubtedly experience it 
differently.  My hope is that this project resonates with the possible or actual 
experiences of others in a wide spectrum of bodily comportments, such that its 
legitimacy is not a matter of being the account of a videogaming experience, but more 
so one such resounding phenomenology. 
Research Procedure 
This eidetic phenomenology will unfold through a series of three reflections 
that draw upon self-generated “performative playings” of one videogame available 
for play on the Nintendo DS handheld videogame console, Animal Crossing: Wild 
World (explained below), in order to thematize both the videogame (as a noematic 
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correlate of the phenomenological field or horizon) and the practice of playing 
videogames (as a noetic correlate of the phenomenological field or horizon).  These 
“performative playings” are rigorous, conscientious videogame play sessions 
performed with the intent of isolating the essential neomatic and neotic structures of 
the videogame phenomenon. 
I have chosen the name “performative playings” for specific reasons.  By 
indicating that my play sessions are performative, I am accounting for videogame 
play as an activity of the body, one that, when undertaken, necessarily generates or 
constitutes a meaningful experience and does not merely “find one inside” the 
videogame itself.  This is to say that meaningful experiences of videogames such as 
the ones I record here are emergent in the mutually constitutive nature of interaction 
between player(s) and videogame.  I do not mean for the moniker to denote anything 
outside the realm of the ordinary or mundane, either.  I am merely recognizing and 
attending to phenomena that normally occur when human beings play videogames, 
setting neither this study nor its associated experiences apart from that to which any 
other player could attend.  To say that an experience of a videogame “normally 
occurs” does not mean any two players can or should claim to have “the same” 
experience when engaged in playing a videogame. 
Undergoing “performative playings” involves a sort of vacillation between the 
flow of play and re-cognition of lived experience.  As I play a videogame, I am 
immersed in a flow of experience and bodily involvement that is necessarily and 
logically different than the moments at which I am re-cognizing experience – trying 
to recall or bring forth the essential elements of the experience I have just had – and 
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describing data for future analysis.  At times, shifting between moments of playful 
experience and moments of re-cognition are abrupt, as recording descriptive data 
with my computer keyboard involves literally disengaging my flowing, embodied 
experience of the videogame by setting the videogame console aside in order to free 
my hands and record experience. 
Recording videogaming experiences allows me to generate descriptions of 
them and reduce these descriptions to essential themes to aid in my eventual 
interpretations.  To place this procedure in the context of a larger methodology, I note 
that the self-generated data of the “performative playings” are generated as part of a 
phenomenological description, the thematized capta emerge as part of a 
phenomenological reduction, and the interplay of such data and capta dialectically 
produces acta – an interpretive orientation toward the data-capta relationship. 
Before outlining the direction and thematic content of my phenomenological 
reflections, I will describe the videogame to be analyzed. 
Animal Crossing: Wild World 
Animal Crossing: Wild World is the 2005 sequel to its predecessor, Animal 
Crossing, released in North America in 2002 and worldwide in 2004.  Both games 
were developed and published by Nintendo and are therefore available only for play 
on Nintendo hardware (the Nintendo DS and Nintendo GameCube, respectively).  
Because Animal Crossing: Wild World (ACWW) is playable on the Nintendo DS 
handheld videogame console, players can interact with this videogame and with each 
other in novel ways facilitated by the hardware – for instance, by way of touch screen 
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interface and wireless Internet access.  Because of these facets, this videogame will 
be the focus of my analysis. 
 AC WW is an open-ended simulation.  That is, like similar videogames such as 
The Sims, it lacks quantifiable winning conditions and emphasizes instead a sort of 
exploratory, “free play,” or “sandbox” engagement in which players take up residence 
in a town, interact with computer-controlled and (occasionally) human-controlled 
characters who live there, perform daily maintenance tasks, collect a myriad of 
creatures and objects, make money, grow flowers and fruit, shop for furniture and 
clothes, decorate their homes and pay mortgages.  The game can thusly be described 
in terms of Juul’s (2005) classic game model: 
Rules: Players explore a one-time randomly generated town where trees, earth, 
rivers and oceans contain different valuable items each (real-time) day.  The town 
store’s stock of goods, purchasable with in-game currency, rotates daily.  Town 
locations and venues are “open” (i.e., accessible to the player) during real-world 
hours; some real-world calendar days present players with in-game holidays and 
events. 
Outcome: No quantifiable outcome.  Players collect varieties of fish, insects 
and fossils for donation to their respective collections in the town museum, or for sale 
at the town store to generate revenue.  The “Happy Room Academy” rates players’ 
interior design and quality of goods; players are awarded with home expansions after 
accumulating sufficient in-game currency. 
Value assigned to outcome: Non-player characters (“NPCs,” or computer-
controlled characters) register likes and dislikes with the player via the town hall or 
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through postal correspondence.  Players are rewarded for buying goods at the town 
store and for talking to NPCs, writing them letters, visiting their houses, running 
errands for them, etc. 
Effort: Players are encouraged to play daily. They are rewarded for doing so 
with new and different goods available daily at the store, and punished for not doing 
so by upsetting correspondences/interactions with lonely or frustrated NPCs, by an 
overgrowth of weeds and dying flowers, and by roach infestations in players’ homes.  
Players must pay a mortgage on their homes with money raised from selling 
harvested goods or running errands for NPCs.  Proper and daily town upkeep is 
rewarded with rare items. 
Attachment: NPCs move in and out of town.  Players write letters to 
townspeople and make friends with them by establishing inside jokes. Players receive 
presents from NPC friends as part of postal correspondences.  NPCs become more 
amicable toward players if players speak to them on a daily basis, visit their homes, 
compose letters to them using proper grammar and inside jokes, and buy them 
presents.  Players are responsible for town upkeep, gardening, arranging 
constellations in the sky, designing the town flag, designing fabric patterns for 
clothing sold in stores, and customizing their avatars with hundreds of different 
articles of clothing and accessories. 
Consequences: As many as four players can congregate in one town 
simultaneously (players can be in the same real-world room or connect via the 
Internet).  Game rules do not provide structured activities for players to engage 
together, though players can generate their own events (hide and seek, trips to the 
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salon, swapping native and exotic fruits, joint fishing ventures, coffee together at the 
museum, etc.).  Players may take pride in housekeeping and town status when hosting 
other players. 
Touch 
My three reflections developed from performative playings of ACWW share a 
common thematic thread: touch.  Touch is currently a salient theme in videogaming, 
as one new videogame console technology – the Nintendo Dual Screen handheld 
console – invites players to interact with videogame software by way of a touch-
screen interface. The close association of touch with sight is also predominant theme 
in much of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy (1964a; 1964b; 1968; 2005).  The 
crisscrossing – the mutually constitutive, codependent nature of sight and touch – 
constitutes a sensual matrix whereby a body may exist in the world.  In Eye and Mind 
(1964b), one of Merleau-Ponty’s most prominent reflections on the nature of vision, 
the author writes: 
There is a human body when, between the seeing and the seen, between the 
touching and the touched, between one eye and the other, between hand and 
hand, a blending of some sort takes place – when the spark is lit between 
sensing and sensible, lighting the fire that will not stop burning until some 
accident of the body will undo what no accident would have sufficed to do [. . 
.]. (p. 164) 
And later, in The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty (1968) observes: 
We must habituate ourselves to think that every visible is cut out in the tangle, 
every tactile being in some manner promised to visibility, and that there is 
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encroachment, infringement, not only between the touched and touching, but 
also between the tangible and the visible, which is encrusted in it, as, 
conversely, the tangible itself is not a nothingness of visibility, is not without 
visual existence. (p. 134) 
This passage – and Merleau-Ponty’s thinking on the whole – has profound 
implications for thinking and theorizing about videogames, as it recognizes the 
activity of multiple bodily senses at work in the practice of videogaming.  Discourse 
about videogames has heretofore emphasized sight as the predominant sense utilized 
in engaging and evaluating videogame texts and experiences; that is, discourse 
defining “good videogames” has been underpinned by occulocentric and 
technocentric criteria dictating that “the best” videogames are those with the most 
“realistic” or complex graphical representations rendered most fluidly on and with 
ever-advanced, computerized console hardware.  Merleau-Ponty’s insistence on 
thinking about sight and touch as intertwined and co-productive shatters much 
conventional thinking about videogames couched in these criteria, and allows a 
reclamation of the body as the locus of meaningful experience in the practice of 
videogaming.  As noted previously in this chapter, thinking about videogaming as an 
embodied practice means beginning analyses of videogames in a theoretical position 
fundamentally different than those approaching the same phenomena from four 
predominant paradigms for videogame study. 
I intend to offer an interpretation of touch as the key to an embodied 
understanding of videogaming (and I use “interpretation” here in the 
phenomenological sense, as the final methodological stage of an eidetic 
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phenomenology).  Merleau-Ponty (1968) indicates several modalities of the sense – 
“three distinct experiences which subtend one another, three dimensions which 
overlap but are distinct” (p. 133) – heuristic for this eidetic phenomenology.  He 
describes 
[. . .] A touching of the sleek and the rough, a touching of the things – a 
passive sentiment of the body and of its space – and finally a veritable 
touching of the touch, when my right hand touches my left hand while it is 
palpating the things, where the “touching subject” passes over to the rank of 
the touched, descends into the things, such that the touch is formed in the 
midst of the world and as it were in the things. (1968, p. 134) 
The three analysis chapters to follow are phenomenological reductions that unpack 
each modality of the touch as they emerge in the descriptions generated from 
performative playings of Animal Crossing: Wild World.  Each concludes with an 
interpretation of touch’s implications for further theorizing about videogaming as an 
embodied practice. 
The first reflection addresses “a touching of the sleek and the rough,” a 
touching of the qualities of the things, or that which occurs as the player touches the 
videogame in a physical or material sense.  In ACWW, as players touch material 
videogame hardware in order to touch synthetic objects in the game world, the act of 
touching becomes a complex experience explicated with the help of Don Ihde’s 
analysis of the role of technology in the reversible relations between body and world 
(Ihde, 2003; Verbeek, 2005).  Here I ask: How do a player’s various carnal modes of 
interacting with videogames function noetically to shape experience of videogaming? 
 
 59
The second reflection uses the first as a context in order to explore “a touching 
of the things,” or the ways in which the game touches the player.  This chapter draws 
heavily on Vivian Sobchack’s theory of interobjectivity – “the possibility of a 
similarly reversible [similar to intersubjectivity] structure of empathy and sympathy 
between our own subjective embodiment and other body-objects” (2004, p. 311) – to 
ask: How does the reversibility of relations inherent in the flesh produce meaningful 
experiences or relationships in or with a videogame?  Here a phenomenology of 
synthetic bodies (Marks, 2002) grounded in the “selfsame flesh” (Sobchack, 2004) as 
players’ bodies – and of players’ engagement with the videogame at a sensuous, 
passionate, carnal level as both subjective object and objective subject – adds a new 
voice to the debate about videogames’ ability to “touch” us in the way a “moving” 
piece of art, literature or music might. 
Using the first two reflections as a ground, then, the third reflection 
interrogates the “veritable touching of the touch,” that moment “where the ‘touching 
subject’ passes over to the rank of the touched, descends into the things” (Merleau-
Ponty, 1968, p. 134). This moment is nothing less than that reversibility of expression 
and perception we call human communication.  With an emphasis on the “touching 
subject” in an intersubjective context, this reflection examines the ways in which 
players “keep in touch” by way of meaningful action in a game space in order to ask: 
How are human communication models relevant in the meaningful context of the 
videogame? Such a relationship presupposes the workings of the material touch 
explored in the first reflection, and the passionate interobjective touch explored in the 
second.  Touch is “a contact sense” (Grosz, 1994, p. 98), and because Merleau-Ponty 
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(2005) reminds us that “each contact of an object with part of our objective body is, 
therefore, in reality a contact with the whole of the present or possible phenomenal 
body” (p. 369), this third reflection utilizes the model of human communication 
advanced by Roman Jakobson (Peterson & Langellier, 2005; Lanigan, 1992; 2000), 
particularly its “contact” element and correlative “phatic” function, to explore the 
ways in which videogame players establish, maintain and prolong meaningful 
experiences with other body-subjects in synthetic space. 
I hope this work contributes to the vastly expanding field of videogame 
studies by relocating the body as a vital site of meaningful experience in the practice 
of videogaming, and to the communication discipline a set of theoretical tools for 
further investigation of a medium whose importance has been largely ignored. 
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Chapter 3 
BEING-IN-THE-(GAME)WORLD 
 
Touching is Good 
The copy on a November 2004 pre-release advertisement for the Nintendo DS 
handheld videogame console reads: 
Touching is not good.  Or so we’re told.  Please do no touch … yourself, your 
nose, wet paint, that zit, grandma’s best china.  You name it, you can’t touch 
it.  We think that’s wrong.  Why shouldn’t you touch what you want?  What if 
you could touch the games you play?  What if you could make something 
jump or shoot or run just by touching it?  Let’s face it, touching the game 
means controlling the game.  And when we say control, we mean precision 
control.  One right touch and you’re master of the universe.  One wrong touch 
and you’re toast.  Forget everything you’ve ever been told and repeat after us.  
Touching is good.  Touching is good. (Nintendo, 2004) 
While the mature, black-and-white advertisement (see Appendix) was foremost a 
divergence from Nintendo’s pastel-filled, traditional advertising (Bulik, 2005), it also 
signaled a profound shift in videogame advertising philosophy per se.  In a market 
historically dominated by products that play to consumers’ visual sensibilities by 
promising intense visual displays, the Nintendo DS advertisement completely 
eschews talk of vision in favor of an embodied sense heretofore largely unaddressed 
in videogame discourse: touch. 
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 The American videogame market’s disregard for touch in discourse about 
videogames and the practice of videogaming might be seen as the natural extension of 
a Western epistemological devaluation of the sense, its conception as a “second-class 
citizen” and subordination to sight (Finnegan, 2002, p. 197). 11  According to Grosz 
(1994): 
Since the earliest days of Greek philosophy, vision was considered superior to 
the other senses.  Knowledge itself was generally described in metaphors 
derived from vision and optics.  Thus it has tended to function not only as the 
model for knowledge but also as representative of all the other senses. (p. 97) 
Because of its ability to function with simultaneity, at a distance from perceptible 
objects and events, and outside typical considerations of causality, vision assumes 
this “privileged position” in Western theorizing, “unifying and hierarchically ordering 
the other senses, taming or honing them” (Grosz, 1994, p. 97).  Crary (1994) similarly 
traces the dissociation of sight and touch with an historical account that reclaims their 
connection.  Touch “had been an integral part of classical theories of vision in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries” (Crary, 1994, p. 19).  Modernity’s toll on this 
relationship is striking, however.  “The subsequent dissociation of touch from sight 
occurs within a pervasive ‘separation of the senses’ and industrial remapping of the 
body in the nineteenth century” (Crary, 1994, p. 19).  In terms of discourse about 
videogaming, this “occulocentrism” perpetuates an epistemological prominence of 
computer-generated graphics as “the” indication or indispensable criterion of a 
“good” videogame console (i.e. – How do we know a good videogame when we see 
one?).   
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Yet the pervasiveness of touch in everyday experience – let alone the practice 
of videogaming – cannot be overlooked as easily.  “The experience of physically 
touching something – other people, external objects – assures us of being in touch 
both with the world outside ourselves and with our own embodied actuality” 
(Finnegan, 2002, p. 196). The ways in which touch as a “contact sense” allows 
players to be “in touch” with other players via the symbolic practice of videogaming 
is the subject of Chapter Five.  As a mode of corporeal engagement, touch “provides 
contiguous access to an abiding object”; produces the notion or shape of form (in a 
diachronic, successive manner); and grants access to texture, depth and surface of 
objects (Grosz, 1994, p. 98).  Moreover, Grosz notes some feminist accounts of touch 
reassert the sense as a precondition for sight – as in the course of human development 
it operates prior to sight – and thus position tactility as superior to visuality. 
In his later work (specifically in the unfinished The Visible and the Invisible) 
Merleau-Ponty devotes much attention to the relationship between sight and touch, 
between vision and tactility.  The two senses, of course, have their individual 
reversible and reflexive capacities, as Merleau-Ponty (1968) writes: “There is a circle 
of the touched and the touching, the touched takes hold of the touching; there is a 
circle of the visible and the seeing, the seeing is not without visible existence [. . .]” 
(p. 143).  But he pushes this idea further in noting that “there is even an inscription of 
the touching in the visible, of the seeing in the tangible – and the converse [. . .]” 
(1968, p. 143).  This description recaptures the interwoven nature of the two senses 
that was all but obliterate by modernity.  “The loss of touch as a conceptual 
component of vision meant the loosening of the eye from the network of referentiality 
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incarnated in tactility and its subjective relation to perceived space” (Crary, 1994, p. 
19).  Merleau-Ponty’s conceptualization of sight as already implicated in touch 
reincarnates a vision modernity empirically isolated. 
So indicating a complete absence of visuality in the “Touching is Good” 
advertisement may not be entirely appropriate; the visible is there, inscribed in the 
tangible when the ad evokes the touch by way of vision (the crusty fingerprints over 
which the copy is printed are all too familiar to gamers whose televisions bear their 
mark) and promises engaging visual experiences by way of the touch (“What if you 
could make something jump or shoot or run just by touching it?”).  Nintendo is 
attempting to prove to players something it says their bodies have known all along 
(“Let’s face it”) but because of both convention (“You name it, you can’t touch it”) 
and technological shortcomings have never been able to actualize (“We think that’s 
wrong.  Why shouldn’t you touch what you want?”): what Merleau-Ponty (1968) 
calls “the double and cross situating of the visible in the tangible and the tangible in 
the visible” (p. 134).  Like Nintendo, Merleau-Ponty wants us to “forget everything 
you’ve ever been told.”  He writes: 
We must habituate ourselves to think that every visible is cut out in the 
tangible, every tactile being in some manner promised to visibility, and that 
there is encroachment, infringement, not only between the touched and the 
touching, but also between the tangible and the visible, which is encrusted in 
it, as, conversely, the tangible itself is not a nothingness of visibility, is not 
without visual existence.  Since the same body sees and touches, visible and 
tangible belong to the same world. (1968, p. 134) 
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In this chapter, I ask: How do a player’s various carnal modes of interacting with 
videogames function noetically to shape experience of videogaming? Recall from 
Chapter 2 that Husserl differentiated between that which is experienced (noema) and 
the mode of its experiencing (noesis).  I am interested in the way a certain material 
technology intersects with an “intertwined” sight-touch to shape my experience of a 
particular videogame.  This particular “intersection,” however, is constituted by 
reflection that organizes a pre-reflective experience of playing videogames.  In other 
words, to say that my body “intersects” with my Nintendo DS is something of a 
misnomer conjured when I reflect on my experience touching the material technology 
– as if I were somehow here while the technology was somehow there, waiting to be 
actualized by my all-knowing touch.  As Sedgwick (2003) notes: 
The sense of touch makes nonsense out of any dualistic understanding of 
agency and passivity; to touch is to always already to reach out, to fondle, to 
heft, to tap, or to enfold, and always to understand other people or natural 
forces as having effectually done so before oneself, if only in the making of 
the textured object. (p. 14) 
I am keen to approach playing videogames from the standpoint of touch because 
doing so situates my experience precisely in the chiasm Merleau-Ponty notes is that 
location of reversibility between subject and object – as immanently arising-from 
rather then transcendentally bearing-on. 
In this specific case, my focus is the role the Nintendo DS videogame console, 
a material technology, plays in the reversible relations between my body and the 
(game)world.  As an investigation of Merleau-Ponty’s first modality of touch – “a 
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touching of the sleek and the rough,” or a touching of the qualities of the things – this 
chapter is a phenomenology of my being-in-the-(game)world, an intentional bodily 
comportment grounded in the intertwining of embodied touch-sight.  In this endeavor, 
I appropriate the typology of human-technology-world relations established by 
phenomenologist and technoscience philosopher Don Ihde. 
Human-Technology-World 
Being-in-the-(game)world involves relating to the space, the gamespace, of 
that world.  And my meaningful experiences of/in videogames and of/in the practice 
of videogaming arise in the chiasm – that primordial, preconscious precondition of 
the body’s already-interwoven, already-intertwined, mutually constitutive relation to 
the world and all “things” (like my body) in it.  From this perspective, then, 
phenomenologist Don Ihde has developed a typology of human-technology-world 
relations in order to “flesh out” (or re-cognize) the many relational modalities of the 
emergent, chiasmatic reversibility of subject and object, and to illustrate the role of 
various technologies in human-world relations.  While Ihde constructed this typology 
over the course of various writings and reflections (see Ihde, 2003, for a brief 
overview), Verbeek (2005) has expertly summarized (and extended) his philosophic 
project. 
For Ihde, technologies can play three roles in the interrelationship of body and 
world.  The first set of human-technology relations is formed by background 
relations, in which humans are related “neither explicitly to a technology nor via a 
technology to the world” (Verbeek, 2005, p. 128).  Rather, technologies shape the 
context of human experience beneath the level of conscious awareness, as 
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exemplified by the thermostat that clicks on and off to regulate the context of 
experience regardless of anyone’s immediate attention.  Ihde illustrates these relations 
through a simple schematic: 
I (-technology/world) 
 The second set of Ihde’s relations results when technologies mediate12 human 
experience.  When bound in these relations, humans are “not directly in bodily-
sensory experience present to the world but are so via technological artifacts” 
(Verbeek, 2005, p. 123, emphasis in original).  Ihde posits two kinds of these 
mediated relations: embodiment relations and hermeneutic relations.  The first, 
embodiment relations, names that which occurs when “human beings take 
technological artifacts into their experiencing, and thereby broaden the area of 
sensitivity of their bodies to the world” (Verbeek, 2005, p. 125), and can be 
illustrated: 
(I-technology) ? world 
One popular example of this type of relation is the relation of human to her 
eyeglasses.  When she is wearing eyeglasses, the subject is unaware of the 
technology’s presence; she takes them into herself or embodies them.  Moreover, her 
comportment in the world is a specific way because of the glasses, and the world is 
constituted a particular way because the glasses mediate embodied experience. 
The second type of mediated relations is hermeneutic relations, in which 
humans “are involved with the world via an artifact, but the artifact is not 
transparent” (Verbeek, 2005, p. 126, emphasis in original), and can be illustrated: 
I ? (technology-world) 
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Here, the world is experienced not through the technology but by means of it 
(Verbeek, 2005).  The world is “read” by way of the technology.  A popular 
hermeneutic relation is that between a human, a thermometer and the world, whereby 
the human makes sense of the conditions or state of the world by reading the 
thermometer’s indicator of temperature. 
 The final set of relations are so-called alterity relations, which exist when 
technology appears as a “quasi-other.”  Thus, humans in this relation are not related 
to the world by or through technology, but to the technology itself.  Alterity relations 
can be illustrated: 
I ? technology (-world) 
In this relation, technological objects “possess a kind of independence,” an “apparent 
autonomy” (Verbeek, 2005, p. 127).  For instance, some humans name their 
computers, bestow upon them an identity, then use this name to curse the machines as 
they malfunction or opaquely impede the user’s intentions. 
 In all these illustrations, however, the notion of the “world” is problematic 
when translating Ihde’s relations for videogame studies.  While videogame consoles 
are indeed technological objects, difficulty arises when we realize that the very 
technological object we engage in the space of the everyday world is in some ways an 
encapsulation of the space of another world – the gameworld.  This is to say, when I 
pick up my Nintendo DS handheld videogame console and place in it the Animal 
Crossing: Wild World videogame cartridge, the world with which I hope to relate is 
not as much the one of everyday space as it is the one of gamespace (i.e., the “town” 
in which I live, Trantor).  As I sit in the space of my bedroom floor, bent over my 
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videogame, another space – a space within this familiar space – is present to me: the 
space of the gameworld.  My body rests on the soft, carpeted floor and my hands 
grasp the body of the videogame – the blue plastic of the Nintendo DS which encases 
two LCD screens, a touch sensor, speakers, directional controls, buttons, circuitry, 
wires, a battery, a stylus housed in a slot, and a game cartridge whose “hardwired” 
algorithms are executed by this ensemble, interface with it as I interface with the 
machine.  When the game is “booted,” the clear screen no longer shows my reflection 
but disappears as the space of the gameworld unfolds to the edges of the screen and 
seemingly beyond.  When Merleau-Ponty (1964c) writes, “We grasp external space 
through our bodily situation” (p. 5) he could not have been more correct about my 
situation.  I am in the middle of my bedroom floor grasping this space, my fingers 
wrapped around it, encompassing a world – while simultaneously comporting both 
my body and the algorithmically-governed body of my avatar in such a way that 
“makes sense” of this space.  Merleau-Ponty (1964c) continues: 
A “corporeal or postural schema” gives us at every moment a global, 
practical, and implicit notion of the relation between our body and things, of 
our hold on them.  A system of possible movements, or “motor projects,” 
radiates from us to our environment.  Our body is not in space like things; it 
inhabits or haunts space. (p. 5) 
How do I make sense of my being-in-the-(game)world – my intentional and 
constitutive relation to the space of my AC: WW town?  The gamespace is populated 
with synthetic objects (my avatar included) generated by codified rules determining a 
very specific system of possible actions, so while I am always immanently “here” – 
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sitting on the floor of my bedroom embracing my Nintendo DS – the space of this 
world is full of potential for action, full of “I cans” that “radiate” into a space that 
both stretches beyond anything I can see, yet is paradoxically contained within my 
grip as I’m aware of my hands wrapped around the back of the console, in a space 
where avatars should play.  Because the Nintendo DS is technologically capable of 
highlighting the synergistic “crisscrossing” of my visual and tactile senses, new 
experiences in this space become available to me, and postural schemas I need in this 
(game)world rub against the “practical” and “implicit” bodily knowledge I take for 
granted in my coping with the everyday world.  My relations with this technology are 
available in several modalities. 
Background Relations, or A ‘Comfortable’ Position ‘Made in Japan’ 
 My being-in-the-(game)world is made possible by technological relations 
outside my ordinary awareness, such that some technologies shape the context of my 
videogaming experience without my noticing them.  For instance, when reflecting on 
my preparations for a session of Animal Crossing: Wild World, I wrote: 
I wouldn’t say that I am a ritualistic gamer, but I do like to be comfortable 
when I play videogames.  I usually occupy the same spot on my bedroom 
floor when I play handheld videogames, and I sit cross-legged with my back 
against the side of my bed.  I’ve tried to sit at a desk while playing, and I’ve 
also tried to play in a recliner.  Neither of these positions, though, is as 
comfortable for me as that sweet spot on my bedroom floor.  Sometimes my 
legs tire and I roll over onto my side, but this typically pins down one of my 
arms and makes controlling the game difficult. 
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In this tiny passage, background relations shaping my experience of videogaming are 
evident.  Particularly, my “comfort” while videogaming is a product of such relations.  
I am seated on a carpeted floor in the second story of my suburban home; both the 
floor supporting my body in a “comfortable” position and the carpet softly brushing 
against my legs and rear are forgettable yet integral to my enjoying this experience.  
Likewise, my wooden bed frame props up my back as my body leans against it (I 
occasionally hear creaks as I shift my weight while playing).  The “absent presence” 
of the floor and the bed thus shape the field of my possible videogaming experiences; 
these technologies are “usually experienced only when they stop functioning” 
(Verbeek, 2005, p. 128).  Such is the case, too, with other technologies with which 
my body relates in the background of experience.  For instance, I wrote the above 
passage on one of the hottest days of the summer, but my body was cool and 
“comfortable” because of the invisible workings of my room’s ceiling fan and closed 
blinds, and of and my home’s central air conditioning unit (a technology not 
necessarily “in” my room, but all around it in my house’s duct work, and outside the 
home, in the humming cooling unit jutting from the side of the building).  Should the 
air conditioning unit have suddenly ceased its silent operations, my experience of this 
videogaming session, my being-in-the-(game)world, might have been quite different. 
 I might also abstract the notion of background relations one step further to 
encompass the social and economic circuits in which my being-in-the-(game)world is 
embedded.  Such an abstraction serves to historicize and politicize my experience of 
AC: WW, as it accounts for the unseen relations of bodies, technology and economic 
systems that give rise to the possibility of such an experience.  After all, “our copy of 
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Zelda or Starcraft did not spring into being ready-made.  It is the outcome of a 
production process, of the combined labor of hundreds of people” (Kline et al, 2003, 
p. 197).  Swirling around my comfortable position on the floor of my bedroom are 
indeed a whole host of “background” socioeconomic relations that fetishize the 
videogames I play, that “present us with goods as if they arrived by magic, hiding the 
mental and manual toil that goes into their making” (Kline et al, 2003, p. 197).  As I 
gaze at the packaging for Animal Crossing: Wild World and notice the three-word, 
past-tense phrase “MADE IN JAPAN” obscured next to an identification barcode and 
serial number, I do not see the bodies at work making this videogame, the “nimble 
fingers” of “a global pool of primarily female cheap labour” struggling to bring this 
game to my bedroom (Kline et al, 2003, p. 205).  In the background are “game 
development testers, producers, distributors, attorneys, accountants, reviewers, 
salespeople/proprietors, advertisers (with their own teams of graphic designers, copy 
personnel, proofreaders, producers, and distributors), and manufacturers (to produce a 
technology on which games are developed and distributed, as well as the packaging in 
which games are sold)” (Ruggill et al, 2004, p. 299).  Like others writing about 
videogames, such as North American journalists, I do not see Nintendo videogames 
such as ACWW “until they appear at [Nintendo’s] highly automated just-in-time 
distribution facility in North Bend, Washington” (Kline et al, 2003, p. 206).  And I do 
not experience the human-technology relations inside this facility, the “computer 
system that communicates its orders by radio frequency, automated guided vehicles, 
pick-by-light racking systems, bar code scanners, and a panoptic surveillance system 
to monitor orders and worker performance” (Kline et al, 2003, p. 206).  When the 
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game is on its way to my expectant hands, I do not experience the political 
contingencies of its arrival.  I see only “FOR SALE, RENTAL AND USE ONLY IN 
USA, CANADA, MEXICO AND LATIN AMERICA” printed on the ACWW 
packaging; I do not experience the stress of relocated bodies: 
In 1994, Nintendo of America laid off 136 US workers involved in 
assembling games and machines at its Redmond headquarters and relocated 
operations to Mexico.  Although the company denied that the move was 
related to the recent North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the 
fired employees were deemed eligible for compensation benefits under the 
NAFTA worker adjustment program, a decision a Nintendo spokesperson 
termed “frustrating.” (Kline et al, 2003, p. 206) 
Finally, from my physical position on the floor in my bedroom made possible by 
technological background relations, when I see also on the videogame’s packaging a 
warning that reads: “IF YOU HAVE EPILEPSY OR HAVE HAD SEIZURES OR 
OTHER UNUSUAL REACTIONS TO FLASHING LIGHTS OR PATTERNS, 
CONSULT A DOCTOR BEFORE PLAYING VIDEO GAMES,” I do not re-cognize 
my occupation of a privileged economic position that allows my access to a 
physician, to the air conditioned home in which I play, or to the videogame and 
console technology itself. 
 As part of phenomenological investigation, I engage in an epoché, a 
“bracketing off” or “isolation” of all but the essential features of the phenomenon 
under scrutiny (Ihde, 1977).  While this act involves typically ignoring temporarily 
and for the purpose of experiential clarity many of the technological, socioeconomic 
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and political background relations that make my experience possible, I can never 
dismiss entirely their role in my being-in-the-(game)world. 
Mediated Relations, or ‘Acts,’ ‘Moments,’ and What My Body ‘Knows’ 
My being-in-the-(game)world is a bodily comportment that situates me 
primarily in mediated relations with the gameworld, and such relations are 
accomplished by my embodied and hermeneutic relations with the Nintendo DS 
console.  This comportment elucidates actions in both everyday space and gamespace 
that are of certain logical types, or as Galloway (2006) states, certain “moments.”  As 
a videogame player (or, to use Galloway’s term, “operator”) my embodied acts are of 
two distinct (in theory) yet overlapping (in practice) spatial moments. 
First are nondiegetic operator acts, or acts “of configuration.  They are always 
executed by the operator and received by the machine.  They happen on the exterior 
of the world of the game but are still part of the game software and completely 
integral to the play of the game”  (Galloway, 2006, p. 12).  Nondiegetic operator acts 
can be directly related to videogame setup.  For instance, in Animal Crossing: Wild 
World, I (the player) am asked to perform nondiegetic acts when my avatar lifts the 
phone in its bedroom (when this happens, a menu appears and I am prompted to set 
certain “options,” “preferences,” and parameters for gameplay).  But nondiegetic 
operator actions can also be the very site of gameplay, Galloway (2006) explains.  
Games like Final Fantasy or Earthbound are “played” almost entirely by menu; that 
is, the player selects menu options to dictate the manner in which combat sequences 
will unfold, the order in which weapons will fire, in which avatars will move and 
where, etc.  In cases like these, playing the game becomes synonymous with 
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configuring the game in nondiegetic moments.  Galloway (2006) admits that on these 
grounds, one might even argue for the complete absence of the diegetic from the 
videogame apparatus. 
Also part of my embodied experience, however, are diegetic operator acts, 
“the moment of direct operator action inside the world of gameplay” (Galloway, 
2006, p. 22).  Diegetic operator acts can be either “move acts” or “expressive acts.”  
The former typically appears in the form of avatar motion and involve adjusting the 
position of the player character in gamespace.  In console videogames, players 
typically perform these acts with one thumb by way of a controller’s analog stick or 
“D-pad” (a four-point directional pad).  Another diegetic operator act is the 
expressive act, whereby the player inter-acts with “actionable” objects in gamespace.  
Expressive acts in AC: WW include shake, dig, open, cast, etc.  In console 
videogames, players typically perform these acts with one thumb by way of a 
controller’s buttons (usually labeled with letters like A, B, X, and Y, or with other 
symbols like geometric shapes). 
These “gamic” (Galloway, 2006) moments flow and overlap in the formal 
videogame apparatus; they bleed into one another, make one another possible – but 
make sense to me only by way of my body and all its sensuous capacities.  My 
recorded videogaming experiences point to an implicit corporeal schema for action in 
these moments that ebb and flow beneath my ordinary level of awareness. 
 When trying to establish some re-cognition of perceptible differences between 
my using “traditional” videogame controls and the Nintendo DS’s touchable 
interface, I wrote: 
 
 76
I feel very different when I use the “manual” DS controls as opposed to the 
touch interface when interacting with the game.  When I’m using the touch 
interface, I’m above the game, outside Trantor, my omniscient hand reaching 
forth and directing the actions of a world.  I touch the ground in front of my 
avatar and he moves to occupy that area.  I touch a tree and he grabs it and 
shakes the fruit from it.  I specify ends, not means; goals, not processes.  
When I am using the D-pad along with “A” and “B” buttons (in a manner I’ve 
been accustomed to for so many years, with all Nintendo’s previous systems), 
I am specifying the reverse.  I press “up” and my character walks northward.  
I stand by the tree, press “A” and shake the fruit from it. 
This experience can be juxtaposed with another: 
Trying to use the traditional directional controls for menu-driven moments in 
the game is awkward – and has been for me as long as I've been playing 
videogames.  How tedious it is to move the on-screen cursor, point by point, 
to get it where it needs to go.  The touchable screen is so liberating!  I can't 
imagine doing something like writing a letter with the on-screen keypad by 
way of traditional controls.  I've been inputting text into videogames since the 
days of arcade high-score initial entry.  Even then, it was hard – but the touch 
screen makes this part of the game so much easier to accomplish. 
The first excerpt is a description of diegetic acts and my body’s engagement in them.  
In a move act, “I touch the ground in front of my avatar and he moves to occupy that 
area.”  The presence of third-person pronouns here indicates my position “above” the 
game or “outside” the diegesis of the gameworld.  The diegetic “pleasure” of being-
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in-the-(game)world is ruptured by my decision to “control” my avatar via the 
touchable screen interface from the “outside” (as opposed to the equally-as-touchable 
D-pad and buttons).  In the case of a diegetic expressive act – shaking a tree to collect 
its fruit – my decision to act on the tree by way of “traditional” controls creates an 
experience whereby the fluidity of the diegesis is upheld.  “I stand by the tree, press 
‘A’ and shake the fruit from it.”  This statement unfolds via first-person pronouns and 
in a burst of action; I am sutured into the gamespace, my being-in-the-(game)world 
upheld by the “traditional” interface.  My body prefers to act in diegetic moments by 
way of an embodied relation to the videogame console’s traditional controls. 
 While in the first passage use of the console’s touchable screen demands a 
comportment that ruptures my being-in-the-(game)world, the technology’s use in the 
second passage actually helps maintain this experience.  Significant here is the fact 
that I am using the touchable screen for nondiegetic acts.  I no longer feel “awkward” 
when manipulating menus, as I do when I attempt these acts with traditional controls.  
Because much of Animal Crossing: Wild World unfolds in nondiegetic moments 
(moments such as the one described above, when I must write a letter to a neighbor 
via an on-screen, non-digetic keyboard), the touchable interface is “liberating” as it 
makes these moments “easier.”  And because this comportment coincides with a 
bodily preference, my vacillations between diegetic and nondiegetic moments 
become more fluid than they are “tedious.”  My body prefers to act in non-digetic 
moments by way of an embodied relation to the videogame console’s touchable 
screen interface controls. 
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Why do I experience “diegetic operator moments” (Galloway, 2006) so 
differently depending on my conscious choice of interface technology?  This passage 
may point to an answer: 
When I am fishing, I notice some distinct disparity.  When fishing with 
traditional controls, I move my avatar along the shoreline with the D-pad, turn 
him to face the silhouette of the fish swimming just beneath the ocean surface, 
and press “A” to cast my line into the water.  I am within my avatar, 
specifying these processes to get my desired fish.  Touching the screen 
requires me to tap my avatar every time I want him to cast his line.  So many 
times, I have tapped the location in the water where I want my lure to drop – 
have reached out to the very spot I see and know the line needs to fall in order 
to catch the fish.  Instead, I need to tap the body of my avatar and watch as he 
casts the line. 
In diegetic moments, “I am within my avatar.”  When my avatar is holding a fishing 
rod (which I have “equipped” in another, nondiegetic, moment), it exhibits now a 
capacity for a new expressive act (“cast”).  If I am “within” my avatar, embodying 
that “implicit notion between our body and things” Merleau-Ponty says facilitates “a 
system of possible movements” that “radiates” from the body’s zero-point, then the 
touch screen’s demand that I touch my body – that I locate expressive capacities on 
the body rather than in the crisscrossing vectors allowing me to grip this space – does 
not “sit” well with my embodied sensibilities.  I see a space where my rod must fall, 
and, as I would in daily life, reach for that space of possibility as I would reach for the 
glass sitting next to me in everyday space.  But I am denied, repressed, befuddled.  
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What I “know” is not what I am prompted to do; the comportment necessary for my 
continued being-in-the-(game)world does not resonate with “what my body knows.”  
A vision “encrusted” in touch means the possibilities I en-vision are promised in 
some way to the touch of my hand in this gameworld; however, in this particular 
experience, such is not the case. 
One more observation about the relation of my body to the videogame 
technology and thus to the gameworld is pertinent here.  In all the above passages, I 
consistently write about “touching” the Nintendo DS console’s touch screen interface.  
In actuality, however, I am not touching the screen directly.  Instead, I am holding a 
plastic stylus pen with which I subsequently touch the screen.  In an embodiment 
relation to the stylus technology, however, I take the stylus into my experiencing 
(Verbeek, 2005).  My touch is honed thanks to the tapered head of the stylus, and thus 
certain en(game)worlded objects become available to (and for) me.  I am not aware of 
the stylus’ presence; I touch it yet claim to touch the world.  But the stylus 
occasionally impinges on my sensible field.  For instance: 
When I am using the stylus, the stylus imposes itself in my field of vision; I 
see the stylus working and flitting across the screen because I can’t see 
through it to the gameworld.  I feel and hear the satisfying “click” of the stylus 
on the touch-sensitive plastic of the Nintendo DS’s bottom screen, but my 
vision is somewhat impaired by the presence of the stylus.  When I am 
moving my avatar without the stylus, I am aware of my hands on the console, 
but they are not part of what I view with my eyes. 
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Maintaining my being-in-the-(game)world means maintaining that “crisscrossing” of 
sight and touch, such that one does not cut or disrupt the other (though they do, as 
Merleau-Ponty notes, “infringe” upon one another).  When that which I touch (now 
apparent to my vision is the fact that I touch not this gameworld but the stylus) 
“imposes itself” on my consciousness (loses its “status” as an embodied technology), 
I must work to regain this relation, reading the algorithms visually and tactically as I 
am – in this a hermeneutic relation with their algorithmic and technological 
processes. 
Alterity Relations, or ‘How the Game Paused Itself’ 
Unlike some techno-futurist accounts of videogaming that leave the body 
behind when articulating the player’s “immersion” in the gameworld, the following 
passage highlights precisely the opposite state of affairs: 
As I neared the end of my play session today, the battery indicator on my 
Nintendo DS flashed bright red and my game paused itself.  A message 
appeared on the DS’s bottom screen: “Your battery is running low.  It may be 
a good idea to save your game soon.”  The message wasn’t talking to Bryan 
the avatar at all.  It was talking to me, Bryan the player.  I am the one in 
control of the DS hardware and I am this world’s only source of life, as my 
failure to plug the unit into the wall after I’ve finished playing today could 
mean “lights out” for Trantor.  I am always reminded, in moments like this, of 
the interplay between hardware, software and gameworld.  In this case, the 
hardware was straining, the software let me know about the battery drain, and 
the “dialogue” between the two interrupted the gameworld.13
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Here, the videogame literally hails me, automatically interrupts its typical functioning 
and calls to me as I am resting on my bedroom floor, holding the Nintendo DS.  I am 
not at all lost in the ether but instead “reminded” not only of the necessity of the 
videogame’s objective body (the plastic and silicon components that make play 
possible), but also of the integral role my body plays in this relationship.  Supposedly, 
“I am the one in control.”   Yet jostled from my relations with the technology and the 
gameworld, I have no choice but to observe the opacity of the Nintendo DS in this 
sudden alterity relation.  I do not pause the videogame; the videogame “pauses itself.”  
In this case, the material constraints of the hardware (in this case, the capacity of the 
battery to hold a charge) are apparent as my being-in-the-game(world) is abruptly 
disengaged, my attention on the technology that sustains this possibility and the 
action demanded of me in the material world of my bedroom.  Without any 
consideration, I save my progress in the videogame and unpack the battery charger; 
my body knows what to do so that I might sustain the world in my hands. 
The videogame hardware and software are here in an inaccessible “dialogue” 
with one another.  This happens occasionally when I play Animal Crossing: Wild 
World: 
When I awaken my avatar and he hops out of bed, I cannot do a thing.  
“Preparing Trantor,” a message on the screen says.  “Please wait.”  I tap the 
screen to no effect; I press the console’s buttons with none, either.  I hear a 
tone that indicates the game is “thinking” – a high, lilting, repetitive arpeggio 
accompanied visually by a spinning arrow.  I can do nothing but wait. 
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When one facet of my embodied sight-touch is severed (here, the touch screen is 
deactivated while the videogame hardware accesses data from the software cartridge), 
I am likewise positioned in an alterity relation with the videogame.  A “discussion” is 
occurring and “I cannot do a thing” in a world where action literally defines my 
presence.  I see but cannot touch; I hear but cannot comprehend.  So accustomed to 
the synergy between sight and touch, and now at the mercy of the Nintendo DS, “I 
can do nothing but wait” while this thing – in its very apparent thing-ness – carries on 
an internal dialogue with itself. 
In an alterity relation with my Nintendo DS console, the material technology 
exhibits a for-itself that profoundly affects my embodied relation to it.  That is to say, 
while my being-in-the-game(world) is disrupted, I nevertheless experience an 
increased awareness of my embodied situation.  The frustration I experience at having 
gameplay halted in order to recharge the console, or at my inability to affect the 
videogame with the usual pokes and prods, is indicative of that very reversibility 
Merleau-Ponty notes is key to our understanding of the body’s interrelationship with 
both the world and enworlded objects.  When “the touched takes hold of the 
touching” (1968, p. 143) – when the Nintendo DS arrests me, grips me – I am aware 
of my body as an object at the mercy of this nonintentional object.  Indeed, my “being 
touched” by the videogame is an experience that requires deeper investigation, as its 
implications extend beyond the scope of my material engagement with a technology 
to the essence of videogames’ aesthetic and ethical capacities.  These capacities are 
the subject of Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 4 
INTEROBJECTIVITY AND THE PASSIONATE PLAYER 
 
“Objects, subjects, world – their common flesh constitutes a moving, 
‘touching,’ manifold of being.” (Sobchack, 2004, p. 308) 
 
“If a typewriter could talk, it probably would have very little to say; our 
automatic washers are probably not hiding secret dream machines deep inside 
their drums.  But these microchips really blow you away.” (Bernstein, 2001, 
p. 157) 
   
I remember the day Lobo moved out.  It occurred so suddenly that it rocked 
me, made my eyes widen and my mouth open to accommodate the sharp, rushing 
intake of air.  In Trantor, the algorithmically controlled wolf, Lobo, was my best 
friend.  He was a competitive, seemingly insensitive beast, always mocking others for 
their fashion choices and attempting continual one-upmanship.  But I knew his 
sensitive side.  I knew how proud he was to call himself my friend, even though I 
always beat him when challenged to a fishing competition.  I remember how we’d 
surreptitiously mail one another letters with enclosed gifts – me, hoping to make a 
better impression; him, trying to compose his messages with that air of egotism but 
undercutting it all with the most special presents.  One day, Lobo invited me to his 
house, and when I arrived, he presented me with a framed photo of himself, the 
highest accolade from any NPC in Animal Crossing: Wild World.  It was a token of 
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friendship.  “Can I tell you something?” he asked.  “I’m thinking of leaving.”  I 
immediately began sending him more mail, more gifts.  I paid him more visits and 
fished with him as often as I could.  He and I had unique nicknames for each other, 
and he laughed with an “Ar-ooo-ooo” every time he hailed me by my codename 
(“Crazy B”).  He kept the same late hours I did, and when the sun had set on the 
Nintendo DS’s upper screen, I knew I’d find Lobo still traipsing about Trantor, 
hunting beetles or fishing for rainbow trout.  He always kept me company.  But 
Lobo’s wanderlust got the better of him, I suppose, because one day I awoke, checked 
my mailbox, and found a letter from Lobo saying he’d gone.  The site of his former 
home is still vacant, as I hope it always will be.  No one – no-thing? – can replace 
Lobo. 
 I was never under the impression that Lobo was anything but a computer-
controlled object – a very specific sequence of 1s and 0s designed to fuse in some 
way with the similar numeric amalgamation that is my avatar – but this doesn’t 
necessarily mean he (or my avatar, for that matter) is something I can’t find touching, 
something that can’t move me or touch me in a profound, embodied way.  
Increasingly, in fact, players ask their videogames to do this.  For instance, as 
Kushner (2006) describes his daughter’s relation with Nintendogs, a puppy training 
simulation on the Nintendo DS, “These pixilated pups exist only in a handheld game, 
never die, and disappear when Sami snaps the case shut.  But the emotions they elicit, 
from pride and love to guilt and envy, are very real” (p. 116).  Most interesting, 
however, is Kushner’s (2006) description of his daughter’s videogame play practices: 
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Sami’s Nintendogs experience began at the door of a dog pound.  The first 
thing she did was wrap her knuckles on the touchscreen.  Her knock was 
answered by the loud yapping of puppies.  Her eyes brightened, her heart 
melted.  The dogs nuzzled up to her finger as she scratched the screen.  
Nintendogs had Sami from “woof.” (p. 116) 
Sami’s visceral relationship to her videogame hardware (wrapping her knuckles on 
the touchscreen) and to her synthetic puppies (“her eyes brightened”) highlights the 
position of the body as the primordial ground from which a player’s conscious 
experience of videogames and the practice of videogaming can immanently emerge. 
 My experience of Lobo’s leaving is no different.  Like Sami, I am a passionate 
player.  Some videogames touch me when I play them; something happens to my 
body when I engage particular videogames (this is to say, some-thing affects me 
when involved in the practice of videogaming).  More specifically, as I – both a 
touching subject and touched object – take up the controller and descend into the 
things of the gameworld (Merleau-Ponty, 1968), the very reversible yet differentiated 
relation of my body to (game) world is underscored.  As noted in Chapter 2, Merleau-
Ponty (1968) elaborated on such a reversible relation between body and world by 
indicating their crisscrossing or intertwining, their grounding in a common “element,” 
which he called flesh.  As Sobchack (2004) explains, “Commonly grounded in and 
made of the ‘selfsame flesh,’ both body and world are thus intertwined – their general 
existence figuring and differentiating itself into particular forms and modes of 
material being” (p. 287).  Such an intertwining is passionate, because “the provisional 
alterity of the subjective body and objective world are reversibly enfolded in the 
 
 86
other” (p. 287).  To say that Sami and I are passionate players is to re-cognize our 
embodied, pre-reflective sense of videogames’ ethical and aesthetic capacities.  These 
capacities – which, as we shall soon see, both engage our very primordial abilities and 
are possible because of them (Sobchack, 2004) – are the subject of this chapter.  In 
asking How does the reversibility of relations inherent in the flesh produce 
meaningful experiences or relationships in or with a videogame, I appropriate Vivian 
Sobchack’s (2004) theory of interobjectivity, outlined in her essay “The Passion of 
the Material,” as an interrogation of the “touching of the things” – of the ways a 
videogame, in all its material capacities, may touch a passionate player. 
Interobjectivity 
 Simply put, interobjectivity is “a mode of corporeal engagement with the 
material world,” and the term itself is “meant specifically to invoke its well-known 
complement: intersubjectivity” (Sobchack, 2004, p. 296, emphasis in original).  Says 
Sobchack (2004): 
Although much has been written by philosophers and theorists across a range 
of disciplines on how human beings co-constitute a sense not only of their 
own subjectivity but also of the subjectivity of others who are not themselves, 
there is little written about the complementary co-constitutive experience we 
have of ourselves and others as material objects. (p. 296) 
In continuing Merleau-Ponty’s later efforts to ultimately overcome the schism 
between subject and object in his existential phenomenology, Sobchack (2004) 
articulates a reversibility in the relations between body-subjects and enworlded 
objects that is possible because both share the common element of being, the flesh – 
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the same flesh that “grounds us as body-subjects in a primordial reversibility with 
other body-subjects so as to allow our essential intersubjectivity and also makes it 
possible for us, in any objective sense, to ‘have’ a world” (Sobchack, 2004, p. 310, 
emphasis in original).  To understand videogames’ ability to touch us, thinking 
interobjectively is key, as I hope to illustrate presently. 
Sobchack’s (2004) theory stands in complementary and contrary relation to 
intersubjectivity. 14  This is to say: 
[. . .] As intersubjectivity is a structure of engagement with the intentional 
behavior of other body-objects from which we recognize what it objectively 
looks like to be subjective, so interobjectivity is a structure of engagement 
with the materiality of other body-objects on which we project our sense of 
what it subjectively feels like to be objective. (p. 316, emphasis in original) 
Here, interobjectivity makes an important contribution to videogame studies.  Some 
explanations for the relationship between player and on-screen representations (such 
as that of Fisler, 2006) turn to a sort of transcendent transference whereby the player 
imbues his or her avatar with (projects onto them) positive qualities that consequently 
guide the performative gameplay experience.  Other theories (such as that of Jansz, 
2005) unnecessarily isolate the videogame experience from the material realm, 
describing players as immersed in cognitive, “private laboratories” (Jansz, 2005, p. 
229), where they might play videogames as an experimental practice, building 
identities and exploring emotional responses without repercussions in the material 
world.  Interobjectivity, however, is neither entirely transcendent nor materially 
irresponsible.  Instead, interobjectivity can explain a player’s touching videogame 
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experiences by staying right “here” – not in an ephemeral private laboratory or a 
transcendent “feedback loop” of psychoanalytic ego projection.  In accounting for 
what it subjectively feels like to be objective, interobjectivity elaborates the immanent, 
already-imbricated, material, fleshy, and mutually-constitutive relationship between 
body-subject (player) and enworlded objects (in the gameworld). 
Of course, thinking about videogames this way requires an awareness of 
synthetic worlds – as well as the avatars and objects that populate them – as 
something other than mere “virtual” or transcendent phenomena (a position all too 
often adopted, unfortunately, in popular discourse about videogames and other 
“digital” media). 15  In asserting the materiality of electronic media, I agree with 
Marks (2002), who argues: 
[. . .] Electronic media occupy not a “virtual” space, but a physical, global 
socioeconomic space.  It all comes down to interconnected bodies: subatomic 
bodies, the linked bodies of our computers, our own bodies that act in 
sympathy with them, and the social body in which we all partake. (p. 177) 
In Touch: Sensuous Theory and Multisensory Media (2002), Marks painstakingly 
depicts a quantum physics of electrons in order to show how those bodies index the 
processes they image – how digital media are, in fact, materially linked with the 
“things” they re-present, as even non-organic life exhibits a “communicative,” self-
organizing capacity.  My point here is not a reconstruction of this argument.  I 
mention Marks’ work as merely one attempt at reasserting the materiality – the 
“realness” – of the so-called “virtual” (often thought to be ephemeral), and concur 
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with her pragmatic, Peircean assertion that “what is actual is what has an effect, in 
that it produces belief that leads to action” (2002, p. 179). 16
Placing interobjectivity in a larger theoretical sphere, we can see it is different 
from other accounts of relations between body-subjects and enworlded objects that 
posit a symmetrical relationship between humans and nonhumans, such as Latour’s 
actor-network theory.  Unlike these views, “ [. . .] interobjectivity is perceived 
asymmetrically – for we are forever subjects even as we are also objects” (Sobchack, 
2004, p. 316).  With a nod to Merleau-Ponty, who in Phenomenology of Perception 
(2005) notes the impossibility of viewing the other as a mere object for the self (that 
is, he notes asymmetry of perception as a prerequisite for intersubjectivity), Sobchack 
(2004) writes: 
[. . .] How can I possibly apprehend another objective body as a nonsubject – 
as in-itself – at all?  Indeed, a phenomenology of interobjectivity would reveal 
that we cannot do so and that, to varying degree, we cannot avoid imbuing 
nonintentional objects with a quasi subjectivity, their excessive opacity 
experienced not as ‘in-itself’ but rather ‘for-itself.’ (p. 313, emphasis in 
original) 17
For Merleau-Ponty (2005) the reversibility of the lived body as both subject and 
object is the source of asymmetry between myself and other “Is” in my field of being.  
This same reversibility – the fact that I have knowledge of my body as perceptible 
matter – indicates a similar asymmetry between my body and enworlded objects (both 
of which are rooted in the flesh).  The notion of asymmetry is important, too, when 
considering the ontological implications of thinking interobjectively.  One might be 
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tempted, as is Galloway (2006), to push the impossibility of viewing an enworlded 
object as a nonsubject into extreme territory.  Galloway (2006) distinguishes 
[. . .] two types of action in video games: machine actions and operator 
actions.  The difference is this: machine actions are acts performed by the 
software and hardware of the game computer, while operator actions are acts 
performed by players.  [. . .] Of course, the division is completely artificial – 
both the machine and the operator work together in a cybernetic relationship 
to effect the various actions of the video game in its entirety.  The two types 
of action are ontologically the same (p. 5). 
This last statement of relative ontological “sameness” is particularly problematic in 
that it attributes to the videogaming (“machine”) apparatus the same capacities of the 
player (or “operator”).  While I intend to argue that the passionate player realizes 
ethical and aesthetic capacities in relation to the videogame, I cannot concede that the 
videogame can enact these same capacities in relation to the passionate player.  While 
the videogaming apparatus might be a body, it lacks the capacity for chiasmatic 
reversibility – for having a body in addition to being a body.  To say a videogame has 
ethical or aesthetic capacities is thus not to point at anything inherent to the 
videogaming apparatus; rather, such capacities arise in-relation-to; the player re-
cognizes his or her passionate entwinement with the videogame when exploring these 
capacities. 
Acknowledging this entwinement is acknowledging the players’ connection to 
the gameworlds they inhabit or the synthetic objects with which they interact.  Too 
often, critics dismiss such passionate connections (such as Sami’s connection to her 
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nintendog, or my connection to Lobo) as overzealous folly, childish imagination, 
fetishism or anthropomorphism – criticisms that are, in short, a way of saying 
videogames don’t matter.  We should not confuse this player tendency with sheer 
anthropomorphism, however.  Sobchack (2004) is explicit about this: 
[. . .] Interobjectivity [. . .] cannot be reduced to a simple anthropomorphism 
in which we attribute our own egological subjectivity to nonsentient existence.  
Rather, it is a more complex structure of experiential relations that cannot 
comprehend absolute and complete objectivity or ‘in-itself-ness’ but, to 
varying degree, confers upon objects an estranged – and thus transcendent – 
subjectivity that seems uncanny in its alterity from our own. (p. 313, emphasis 
in original) 
Interobjectivity is thus an appreciation, in the original Husserlian phenomenological 
spirit, of the things themselves – an appreciation of nonintentional objects’ quasi-
subjective alterity that is nevertheless a fleshy alterity and indeed matters very much.  
In fact, videogames are something about which one can be passionate.  As previously 
mentioned, to say that I am a passionate player is not to attribute to myself any 
unnatural capacities or a hyper-specialized receptivity (i.e., fandom, brand loyalty, 
commodity fetishism, etc., although these are undeniably part of my experience of the 
practice of videogaming).  Rather, it is to say videogames activate exactly the pre-
reflective abilities inherent in the selfsame flesh my body – any-body – shares with 
the quasi-subjective body-objects of the (enworlded) gameworld.  I invoke the notion 
of “passion” here in the dual way Sobchack (2004) does: as both “suffering” and 
“active devotion to others” experienced in the reversible yet differentiated relations of 
 
 92
body and world.  As I will presently demonstrate, the player’s relations with 
gameworld are passionate inasmuch as they have both ethical and aesthetic 
implications. 
 Before discussing these implications, however, I should provide a few caveats 
regarding the scope of this analysis.  Interobjectivity “makes sense” of some games 
more clearly than it does others.  Like any phenomenology of interobjectivity, a 
phenomenology of videogames’ interobjective touch 
includes a wide and graded range of subjectively experienced reversibility 
with objects, varying in both the ratio of this reversibility (how proportionally 
subjective and for-itself is the object since there is a great variance in kicking 
the tire of one’s car, giving a boat a proper name, and believing in the 
subjective agency of a magic charm) and the degree to which this experienced 
reversibility of subject and object is transparent or explicit to consciousness. 
(Sobchack, 2004, p. 314, emphasis in original) 
Various phenomenological accounts of videogame experience will thus reveal 
varying ratios of reversibility between player-subject and enworlded videogame 
objects, and this ratio is somewhat reliant on the videogame’s genre.  Objects in 
puzzle videogames (like Tetris) and videogames that are largely reflex-oriented 
(WarioWare, Inc., for example) do not clearly exhibit a significant ratio of quasi-
subjective reversibility as cogently as, say, those in first-person shooter videogames 
(such as Half-Life) or open-ended “simulation” videogames (like The Sims).  In other 
words, the relative for-itself of a geometric Tetris block might differ from that of a 
Sims avatar specifically designed to resemble a player’s mother.  Animal Crossing: 
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Wild World is a videogame rife with interobjective implications for many reasons.  
Foremost, although the videogame lacks an overarching goal or end state (see 
Chapter 2), players are rewarded intermittently for care-ful choices and persistent 
interaction with synthetic objects.  Additionally, many of these objects are 
anthropomorphized animals that nevertheless speak in a language (English) embodied 
by the player.  Apart from their being populated by talking animals, however, players’ 
towns in ACWW are not much odder than those a player might encounter in his 
everyday world.  Likewise, players are rewarded not for using strange devices in the 
completion of superhuman feats (as is the case in some videogames); rather, they are 
asked to acquire familiar objects (such as shovels and fishing poles) so that they may 
“play at” seemingly mundane tasks (digging holes in which to plant trees and fishing 
to acquire multiple varieties of aquatic life).  As Bernstein (2001) laments: 
 In a society in which the desire for general economy is routinely sublimated 
into utilitarian behaviors, the lure of video games has to be understood as, in 
part, related to their sheer unproductivity.  Put more simply, our unrestricted 
play is constantly being channeled into goal-directed games; how appealing 
then to find a game whose essence seems to be totally useless play. (pp. 158-
159) 
 Additionally, the ACWW world seems persistent.  That is, its gameworld is 
constantly changing with each play session, presenting new objects and variables for 
the player to acquire or encounter but also keeping track (from play session to play 
session) of players’ personal belongings stored in their rooms and cabinets.  The 
world seems to “live” even as the Nintendo DS device is turned off.  Non-player 
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controlled animal residents move in and out of town between sessions, trees grow a 
bit taller every day, fruit appears at three-day intervals, and the town store restocks its 
shelves with new goods every night.  Such persistence grants much of the objects in 
the gameworld an agency not common in most videogames. 18  And as the in-game 
clock and calendar correspond exactly to their out-game counterparts, a player’s sense 
of a connection between the two spaces is enhanced. 19  For these and other reasons, 
Animal Crossing: Wild World is a videogame of which interobjectivity can “make 
sense,” and which can demonstrate the usefulness of thinking phenomenologically 
and interobjectively about videogames.  Thinking this way helps us re-cognize 
passionate players’ embodied, pre-reflective sense of videogames’ ethical and 
aesthetic capacities20.  I turn to these capacities now, so that I might illustrate how 
such players’ touching, subjective diminution and expansion is accomplished in and 
with objective phenomena – namely rule sets – via the gameworld provided by the 
body of the videogame. 
Ethics 
“ [. . .] It is a kind of magic spell which is cast; the act of interacting with 
these texts [. . .] is a kind of ritual whereby the human enters the realm of the 
machine and operates by its rules.” (Lamoureux, 2004, p. 86) 
 
In its first modality, passion, for Sobchack (2004), is suffering, or “the state or 
capacity of being acted on and affected by external agents and forces [. . .] (p. 287, 
emphasis in original).  As both subjects and objects are capable of suffering, this 
modality of passion 
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names a certain condition for passive existence in which a body-subject or an 
embodied object is subjected to the will of others or the action of external 
forces, and insofar as it suggests a lack of intentional agency, the passion of 
suffering brings subjective being into intimate contact with its brute 
materiality and links it, as well, to the passive, mute, and inanimate objects of 
the world. (p. 287) 
Furthermore, when suffering, the body-subject is constituted as an object (by 
nonintentional phenomena or other intentional body-subjects) and experiences a 
diminution of subjectivity with/as an increased awareness of “what it is to be a 
material object” (Sobchack, 2004, p. 288, emphasis in original).  In this way, passion 
as suffering provides the material foundation of ethical behavior toward other body-
subjects and enworlded objects because it “intimately engages us with our primordial, 
prereflective, and passive material response-ability – the general sense of which 
becomes reflectively and actively re-cognized in consciousness as that particular 
ethical concept we call responsibility” (p. 288, emphasis in original). 
 In her submission to the rules of the videogame – to anything from the 
selection of an avatar; the deliberate, unintentional, but nevertheless powerfully 
relevant (in their immutability) decisions of game designers or narrative architects; 
the binary oppositions constituting the choices, the avenues for agency – the 
passionate player suffers a bit.  But unlike the experience described by Lamoureux at 
this section’s outset, the practice of videogaming is not “magic,” even if it does 
involve an oddly alluring shackling the of the player’s agency “in” the gameworld.  
By getting “in touch” with her material side, by experiencing at a corporeal level 
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what Sobchack (2004) calls “a diminution of subjectivity,” “an increased awareness 
of what it is to be a material object,” the player is reminded of her parity with the 
things of the world (the gameworld and the everyday world), of her responsibility to 
them. 
 Perhaps the most obvious and ubiquitous diminution of subjectivity that 
results in a passionate player’s increased awareness of his materiality is the player’s 
avatar selection and manipulation.  In Animal Crossing: Wild World, for instance, a 
player’s entrance into the gameworld is predicated on his creating an avatar (literally 
“some-body who embodies, personifies, or is the manifestation of an idea or 
concept,” according to the Encarta World English Dictionary).  At the outset of 
ACWW, the screen opens on a first-person perspective; the player is looking at the 
back of a taxi driver’s head from the rear seat of the vehicle.  The player soon learns 
that the driver is taking him to live in a new town, and he must also field questions 
from the taxi driver (the answers to which shape the eventual gender, hair color, and 
facial arrangement of the player’s avatar, as well as the geography of the player’s 
town).  The first-person perspective compels the player to answer questions from his 
or her standpoint, from the standpoint of the body embracing the Nintendo DS unit. 21  
From the start, then, the avatar is meant to be a manifestation of the player, an object 
in the gameworld that attains a significant for-itself as its operations (its movements, 
its relative “successes” and “failures”) are governed tightly by the movements of the 
player’s body while grounded in a common element pervading the stuff of the 
gameworld.  When the ACWW player has finished answering the questions, the screen 
fades and re-opens on the player’s new town.  Now the player’s perspective has 
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shifted to a third-person view of the world, the avatar in the foreground, the world 
already in motion around it.  The avatar is representative of the player’s capacities in 
this alien world, a world whose material often obeys an unknown physics, whose 
familiar objects may or may not perform familiar functions, whose quasi-subject 
population already “know” one another and treat the player as an equally alien 
transplant. 
At the most basic level, the avatar is a cluster of computer-manipulated 
variables – rules – that dictate potentials, allowable actions in this newfound game 
space.  Because no videogame hardware – any hardware – has the ability to represent 
the human body’s complete range of potential or an enworlded object’s properties 
(only simulate certain facets of this existence), the player who engages in a 
videogame is always allowed to do less than that which she would otherwise be able 
to do in everyday space.  The avatar is a constricting, diminutive body-object that is 
nonetheless the player’s entry point in the gameworld, responsive to the player’s 
touch (I press “up” on my control pad and the avatar makes the corresponding 
movements in the same direction in game space).  It reduces the player, in many 
ways, to something less than he would otherwise be accustomed. The relationship of 
player to avatar is thus not one of projection or transference.  The body of the player 
is always present as the primordial ground from which she may corporeally engage 
the on-screen quasi-subject that is the avatar – an object whose materiality is very 
apparent to the player who nevertheless identifies subjectively with its selfsameness.  
In playing videogames, the player suffers the brute materiality of the alien 
gameworld, as a heightened awareness of her own objectivity rendered in the game 
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space.  This suffering “forces” the player’s recognition of herself as an objective 
subject, “always immanently and substantially ‘here’ and open to being externally 
acted on regardless of one’s volition” (Sobchack, 2004, p. 288). 
In this way, then, the player’s diminished agency activates a deep-seated, pre-
reflective response-ability that manifests as a responsible sensitivity to other material 
objects in the gameworld.  As I wrote one day after a particularly frustrating game of 
Animal Crossing: Wild World: 
I love this matter, because I can push it, pull it, do things with it I can’t do in 
the real world.  But there are some things I cannot do, and in a gamespace 
typically conceived as totally relativistic and liberating, this reality is 
frustrating.  Rocks speckle the landscape of my town, and they are 
immovable.  Stuck in the most odd places, with no apparent pattern to their 
arrangement, they haunt me and bother me on daily basis, especially when I 
am enjoying my newfound freedom to dig synthetic dirt, plant peach trees and 
orange trees, chop other pine trees down, uproot their stumps within a matter 
of seconds.  But these rocks are steadfast in a world that should otherwise be 
mine to manipulate; they are more than an annoyance, they are a downright 
frustration, a nuisance when they obstruct the perfect symmetry of the rows of 
trees in my peach orchard, or cause my avatar to bounce forcefully from their 
granite surfaces as I am attempting to dig new spaces for more vegetation.  I 
have become obsessed with trying to move them, to push them, to crack them 
with a shovel, an axe, even a butterfly net.  Taunting me, some of these rocks 
toss bags of currency at me as I poke and prod them, try to erase them, and 
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this makes me even more upset.  My fingers writhing at the ineffectiveness of 
their actions, I turn quickly to a nearby tree and hack at it with my axe, 
listening to the satisfying “whack” of the axe as it embeds itself in the trunk of 
the pine, loving the crinkling, crackling sound of its collapsing branches as it 
falls to the ground.  I am master once again, but even though I have the power 
to erase this tree from existence (it dissolves away after lying on the ground 
for a few seconds), because it, unlike the rock, succumbs to the meeting of my 
code with its code, just what gives me the right to – for all intents and 
purposes – kill it? 
The material presence of the rocks in my town – representations of rules that stipulate 
where I can and can’t “dig” in the synthetic dirt – supercedes my volition, my desire 
to bend and shape the world in exact places.  It is a rock without the capacity to be 
acted upon – or, as Galloway (2006) would say, it is “non-actionable.”  If this rock 
were a rock of everyday space, I would have no trouble bending and heaving it to 
another location.  But in this gameworld I am “subjected” to the alterity of the 
synthetic objects, representations of diminished potential.  My fingers “writhe” with 
the itch of constriction and frustration as I am literally overwhelmed by the 
pervasiveness and unrelenting reality of the rock (of its subjective for-itself, which it 
flaunts by “taunting” me).  What this reality produces, however, is an embodied 
consciousness of my own objectivity, an increased awareness of my capacities, as I 
turn to another object and attempt to “master” it.  Now, however, my visceral 
response to the pervasiveness of the rock makes me feel somewhat responsible to the 
well being of the other objects in my gameworld. 
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 Responsibility to a rock may not resonate with the experience of many other 
videogame players, but responsibility to other objects might, locating an 
interobjectivity of videogaming in the current debate about videogames’ ethical 
capacities.  For instance, in the videogame September 12th by Gonzala Frasca, players 
are situated in a first-person perspective overlooking what appears to be a Middle 
Eastern outdoor marketplace.  The player receives these instructions: 
This is not a game.  You can’t win and you can’t lose.  This is a simulation.  It 
has no ending.  It has already begun.  The rules are deadly simple.  You can 
shoot.  Or not.  This is a simple model you can use to explore some aspects of 
the war or terror. 
Two images appear to the left of these instructions: one of a robed and hooded human 
figure holding a gun and one of a similarly-dressed adult-sized figure leading a child-
sized figured.  The figure holding the gun is dressed in white and labeled “terrorist” 
and the other figures are dressed in blue and labeled “civilian.”  When the instructions 
disappear, the player is given a birds-eye view of the Middle Eastern marketplace, 
and, using the computer mouse, is able to point a crosshairs at any location on-screen.  
Tiny figures scuttle about the streets of the marketplace; the ratio of “terrorists” to 
“civilians” indicates more civilians than terrorists in this location. 
 The instructions for this simulation indicate a capacity for the player – “you 
can shoot.”  Of course, this capacity need not be realized (“Or not.”).  If the player 
decides to click the muse button, a missile launches from a site off-screen and lands 
inside the aimed crosshairs.  All avatars in the circumference of the crosshairs 
collapse, buildings turn to rubble and avatars nearby stop to mourn the losses with 
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visible tears and audible sobs.  No matter who dies in the blast – terrorist or civilian 
alike – the mourners unfailingly become “terrorists,” their clothes changing to 
represent a new perspective.  At least two terrorists spawn as a result of every one 
death; thus, the ratio of terrorist to civilians increases exponentially with every 
missile the player fires.  Conversely, if the player chooses not to activate the capacity 
to shoot – chooses not to depress the mouse button – the number of terrorists in the 
marketplace gradually decreases.  In fact, if a remorseful player stops shooting 
missiles and lets the marketplace alone, she will notice buildings regenerating 
themselves, terrorists changing into civilian clothes. 
 In response to the objects of the gameworld, the player must choose a certain 
responsible comportment in relation to the quasi-subjects she engages on-screen.  
Rendered as the crosshairs and left with only two capacities (shoot, or don’t), the 
player’s diminished subjectivity results in a powerful, visceral awareness of the 
importance of the mouse click.  Omniscient and at the same time powerless, the 
player is overrun by the materiality of a terrorist swarm that occurs if he continues 
shooting; his responsibility for the decadence of this place becomes suffocating. 
Aesthetics 
“The Luddites wanted to smash the machines of the Industrial Revolution – 
and who can fail to see the touching beauty in their impossible dream.  But 
there can be no returns, no repetitions, only deposits, depositions [. . .] The 
games [. . .] give us a place to play out these neo-Luddite sentiments: slay the 
dragon, the ghost in the machine, the berserk robots.  What we are fighting is 
the projection of our sense of inferiority before our own creation.  I don’t 
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mean that the computer must always play us.  Maybe, with just a few more 
quarters, we can turn the tables.” (Bernstein, 2001, pp. 167-168) 
 
 In its second modality, passion, for Sobchack (2004), is active devotion to 
others and the material world, or “an intense, driving, and overmastering feeling that 
emerges and expands beyond our conscious will yet acts on us, nonetheless, from 
within” (p. 288, emphasis in original).  Like suffering, this modality of passion is “in 
excess of our volition,” but “unlike suffering, it is within our agency [. . .] This 
devotion is not passive but rather asserts our corporeal and affective adherence to 
others and the objective world” (p. 288).  Passion as active devotion thus “seeks to 
grasp what it is to be not only an objective subject but also a subjective object whose 
intentionality and alterity can be sensed from without” (p. 290, emphasis in original).  
And so unlike passive suffering, active devotion involves an “embracing and 
enfolding of the world’s – and one’s own – objectivity” that is “not a diminution of 
subjectivity but its sensual and sensible expansion” (p. 290, emphasis in original).  In 
this way, passion as active devotion to others and to the world provides the material 
foundation of aesthetic behavior because it “allows us to understand in a primordial 
way the general pervasion in existence of material sense-ability” (p. 290), our sense 
of which becomes re-cognized in consciousness as that particular aesthetic concept 
we call sensibility.  Such recognition involves, as Sobchack (2004) notes: 
[. . .] Care for ourselves not only as objective subjects who are capable of 
grasping and feeling the alterity of other worldly objects but also subjective 
objects that can be experienced in such a way by others allows us the 
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possibility of appreciating – and caring for – the form and substance of 
“things” external to ourselves. (p. 290) 
With this “sensual and sensible expansion” (the player’s exploration of the 
gameworld, her rediscovery of herself in a new, bounded context) and in this 
“enfolding” of an alterity (her carnal interactions with the gameworld’s opaque and 
quasi-subjective objects, others that at first belong more to the alien world of the 
videogame but become gradually recognizable in the common flesh of the player-as-
avatar) emerges a certain ekstasis, a “profane illumination of objective matter that, in 
its unrelenting ‘hereness’ and ‘nowness’ opens into an apprehension of something 
ultimately unfathomable, uncontained and uncontainable – not only in the thing on 
which we gaze but also in ourselves” (Sobchack, 2004, p. 298).22  As I wrote upon 
seeing two computer-controlled residents interact: 
From afar, I see Alli and Portia (an alligator and a dog, respectively) having a 
conversation.  I hear a joyful tone, and watch as both their faces fill with 
smiles.  Music notes float around their faces, I hear a whistling sound, and 
both go their separate ways, content with the conversation they just had.  I 
wonder: what did they just talk about?  How did they become such good 
friends?  And why wasn’t I close enough to overhear the conversation?  When 
I watch the characters in my town interact with one another, I’m warmed and 
intrigued.  I’m intrigued because part of me still knows these little animals are 
driven by algorithms, that this encounter may or may not have been 
programmed for my enjoyment. I’m warmed, though, because it’s not easy to 
think that these friends of mine aren’t the kind animals who want to be 
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gregarious, make friends, wave to me, and smile.  The synthetic world of my 
town seems alive around me as I am part of it, its objects enacting their own 
agency without my having to set them in motion.  To think that parts of the 
videogame have pleasurable experiences – the indications of which are 
exclamation points, avatar smiles and singsongy whistles – simply by 
interacting with one another is a notion I’m struck by (because I’m not 
accustomed to it) and disappointed by (because it makes me feel less 
necessary). 
While I am “struck” and humbled (“disappointed”) by the brute acknowledgment that 
the objects of the gameworld – in this case two anthropomorphized animals – may in 
fact “have” a world distinct from my own  (“enact their own agency” without waiting 
for my touch) I am nonetheless “warmed” by the beauty of my realization that these 
quasi-subjects escape or transcend my complete understanding, and by my desire to 
know them, to enfold them, to assuage my alienation from them – to grasp what it is 
to be not only an objective subject but also a subjective object (Sobchack, 2004).  It is 
an ekstasis realized in the very chiasmatic reversibility of the flesh. 
 Indeed, this sensible ekstasis is made possible by the flesh’s reversibility 
because it 
is an in-corporation that, through reaching toward or touching the material 
object that is other than oneself, seeks to actively grasp both a concrete sense 
of one’s own self as immanently material and a concrete sense of how some of 
the world’s objects may also be subjects. (Sobchack, 2004, p. 290, emphasis 
added) 
 
 105
“Embracing” knowledge of oneself as a material object – rendered in code as in-game 
avatar, subjected to the rules, laws and nature of the gameworld, agency apparently 
diminished – allows for an incompetence that is nevertheless a revelatory 
incompetence, an expansive incompetence, as that unwilled devotion to the objects of 
the gameworld compels a player to forge new linkages in bounded contexts, and 
likewise embrace the quasi-subjective objects that surround her.  Players constantly 
and actively engage gameworlds (like Trantor) in their “care-ful” devotion to the 
project of its enfolding.  In ACWW, players are rewarded extrinsically for playing 
daily (i.e., by the rules of the game, which dictate that flowers must be watered on a 
daily basis if they are to retain their color); yet they are always rewarded intrinsically 
by the ekstasis of such a project, by the sensuous expansion involved in playing. 23  
For instance, in writing about her experience playing The Sims, Jackson (2004) says: 
[. . .] I’m picturing a thirteen-year-old girl sitting at her computer, watching a 
sort of doll reading a book.  The girl sits quietly.  The Sim sits quietly.  Pages 
turn with a rustle.  The plates on the kitchen floor acquires [sic] flies and 
begins to buzz.  The newspaper turns a dirty grey.  The need to pee is getting 
urgent, on both sides of the screen.  What is happening?  Nothing and 
everything.  When my Sim reads a book, sunk in an illusory inwardness, a bit 
of code flipping the pages of another bit of code, I imagine for her an 
imaginary life, and imagining this, my world brightens, and I think I feel what 
it is like to be real. (p. 200) 
Like I am when speaking of my friend Lobo, Jackson (2004) is aware of her Sims as 
bits of code interacting with other bits of code – but also as opaque alterities not 
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completely knowable, not completely transparent, not completely congruent with 
everyday existence, yet bearing the mark of a subjectivity, a capacity for meaning-
making in their relation to the player.  The interobjective touch of the Sims helps her 
“feel what it is like to be real,” reminds her of her immanent “here-ness,” moves her 
to subjective recognition of her own embodied self because (with a nod to Lacan and 
his Mirror Phase, and an implicit recognition of the reversibility of Merleau-Ponty’s 
flesh) she innately knows “we make the real real by imitating it” (p. 195). 
 All these abstract notions become a bit more concrete in accounts such as 
Sami’s, or this one I wrote after a fulfilling interaction with an NPC: 
I’m always happy when the NPCs in my town are content and pleased with 
me as their neighbor.  I understand that keeping my townsfolk in a “good” 
mood is part and parcel of playing the game, yet my motivation for chatting 
with and helping out my computer-controlled friends genuinely stems from 
something other than a sheer desire to play this videogame and play it well.  
When Moe (a sad-eyed, forlorn tomcat) today mentioned our growing 
“relationship,” I felt great.  My DS is now turned off and sitting on the floor 
next to me, but I can imagine Moe resting in his Trantorian home, all the tasks 
of the day accomplished, and perhaps thinking about how helpful I’d been 
today. 
My actions in Trantor are extraordinarily “care-ful,” as I treat the digital denizens 
delicately, considering their “feelings” and their needs.  Sami’s active devotion to her 
nintendogs – which may seem to some like a child’s frivolous attention to something 
that doesn’t matter – is instead a passionate bodily comportment.  As so-called 
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“active” media (Janz, 2005), videogames are uniquely suited to this sensible and 
sensuous expansion (differently than are other media, such as books or films, which 
also possess their own aesthetic properties), because they are not merely active media 
but interactive media – the prefix necessarily appended to account for a chiasmatic 
“between-ness,” the reversibility inherent in “the touching of the things.” 
Conclusion 
The interobjective touch is crucial to our understanding of the passionate 
player’s meaningful experiences in, or relationships with, a videogame.  “The 
experience of worldly devotion that is sublime emerges from some material 
communion of the body-subject with the objective world, and in the experience of 
being subjectively touched by objectivity in a concrete, if fleeting, comprehension by 
– and of – the flesh” (Sobchack, 2004, p. 310, emphasis in original).  That “manifold 
of being” constituted by the intertwining of body, object and world is possible not 
because videogames provide an otherworldly or transcendent “realm” for our 
disembodied, “virtual” experimentation but is rather dependent on the recognition of 
videogaming as an embodied practice – something about which we can be passionate, 
can find touching, can experience only through the body’s communion with the flesh 
of the world. 
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Chapter 5 
STAYING IN CONTACT, KEEPING IN TOUCH 
 
 Nintendo’s Web site advertising Animal Crossing: Wild World is full of 
exclamation points, especially when it touts the game’s ability to let players “Meet 
and socialize with gamers from all ‘round the Wild World!” (Nintendo).  
Undoubtedly, one of the videogame’s most novel and engaging features is its ability 
to utilize the Nintendo DS’s on-board wireless Internet connection technology to 
facilitate online gameplay.  When players’ Nintendo DS consoles start swapping 
packets in cyberspace, on-screen avatars cautiously leave their town gates (which 
open with a heaving sigh and bathe the avatar in a golden light) and inhabit the 
gameworld of another.  Interacting online, players can “visit the villages of other 
players and interact with the players in real time [. . .].  Chat, show emotions, trade & 
share items, play games together, and show off your accomplishments!” (Nintendo).  
As players – situated across the kitchen table or across the globe – touch their 
consoles, their avatars are having a blast: 
Show ‘em your custom designs.  You could start a worldwide craze!  Throw a 
party in your house.  Your friends will rock out to arcade machines, stereos 
and more!  Challenge your new friends to fishing and bug-catching 
competitions!  Find rare items.  Sell ‘em for a premium to visitors! (Nintendo) 
By opening the videogame console to the Internet, the Nintendo DS thus allows 
players to trade clothing they’ve personally designed, help one another complete 
collections of household items and stationary, donate animals and artifacts to one 
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another’s museums, and visit NPCs to make computer-controlled friends.  Online 
play is encouraged by the videogame, as certain in-game prices and locations only 
become available when one Nintendo DS connects with another. 
 To say players are “catching bugs” and “throwing parties” is to speak very 
symbolically about their embodied activity in the gameworld.  Players are not, of 
course, engaged in the same type of bodily activity they would be if they put down 
their Nintendo DS consoles and moved outside to plant a dandelion in a friend’s 
flower bed.  But the distinction I draw here is not an attempt at devaluing the 
meaningful actions in which players participate – together, with one another – in 
videogame spaces.  Indeed, the goal of the present and final chapter might be read as 
an attempt to re-evaluate videogames as sites of embodied, meaningful, lived 
experience in the lives of players who embrace and “play” them with others. 
My previous two phenomenological reflections focused on modalities of 
touch as outlined by Merleau-Ponty (1968) – that is, on a “touching of the sleek and 
the rough” and “a touching of the things,” respectively.  This third and final reflection 
uses the others as an experiential ground with which to explore what Merleau-Ponty 
(1968) calls: 
[. . .] a veritable touching of the touch, when my right hand touches my left 
hand while it is palpating the things, where the “touching subject” passes over 
to the rank to the touched, descends into the things, such that the touch is 
formed in the midst of the world and as it were in the things. (p. 134) 
In asking How are human communication models relevant in the meaningful context 
of the videogame?, I interrogate my experience playing ACWW online with others in 
 
 110
order to illustrate specifically the communicative capacities of both videogames and 
the practice of videogaming.  Using Roman Jakobson’s (1960) model of human 
communication, I explore the ways in which players use videogames like Animal 
Crossing: Wild World to “keep in touch” – that is, to initiate, prolong and maintain 
meaningful interactions with one another.  Jakobson’s model is privileged here 
because it “focuses on how communication is given to consciousness (eidetic) as the 
conduct of embodied discourse (empirical) and not merely as decontextualized and 
disembodied data” (Peterson & Langellier, 2005, p. 125).  If I am to argue that 
videogaming is communicative, then I cannot ignore the vital role of the body in 
converting conscious experience to an experience of consciousness.  Merleau-Ponty’s 
(1968) “palpating” touching of the touch is exploratory insofar as it is expansive, yet 
immanently grounded insofar as bodily practices that seem to disappear in this 
conversion nevertheless underpin experience, facilitate it, allow for it.  In other 
words, while that reversibility of expression and perception occurring when “the 
‘touching subject’ passes over to the rank of the touched” seems somewhat 
transcendent, such a reversibility still “has” as its locus a very concrete and material 
positional contingency “in the midst of the world.”  Such contingency is twofold, as I 
will explain; the subject matter of Chapters 3 and 4 are these very preconditions. 
 Before turning to my reduction and interpretation of the descriptive data I 
generated while playing ACWW with others, I must address the limitations of the 
present analysis.  First, my experiences in playing ACWW online represent only one 
of two possible experiential modalities of this type of play.  This particular 
videogame offers players two types of multiplayer gameplay: “DS to DS” and 
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“Nintendo Wifi Connection.”  I have engaged in multiplayer videogame play by way 
of the latter – “Nintendo Wifi Connection” – which allows players to connect their 
DS consoles to the Internet in order to access the towns of other players from all over 
the globe.  The former type of wireless multiplayer gameplay – “DS to DS” – 
necessitates that players occupy the same physical space in order to connect their DS 
units directly to one another (without the involvement of the Internet) and visit one 
another’s digital villages.  Physical proximity of players has a decisive influence on 
the nature of in-game activity, the ways in which messages are created and shared 
between players, notions of perceived space and context, and the salience of certain 
aspects of videogame play experience.  I did not engage in any “DS to DS” 
multiplayer activity when generating data for my analysis, so this play option remains 
an unexplored experiential variation. 
 Secondly, many of the experiences I recount in the present analysis take shape 
according to my relationship with the other player in my shared space.  In this case, 
the player with whom I play ACWW most frequently will be called “iamus.”  Iamus is 
an ACWW player whom I have never met in physical space, but with whom I 
correspond online via bulletin boards and related private messages.  Iamus controls an 
avatar by the name of Mr. Nova and maintains a town called Pondlton.  ACWW is the 
primary interest I share with iamus (whose gender is unknown to me), and constitutes 
the basis for our continued relationship (that is, our meeting online was motivated by 
a mutual desire to play this videogame together, and our continued correspondence 
revolves centrally around discussion of ACWW).  Other players may play this 
videogame with longtime friends, relatives, coworkers, or individuals of other 
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relation – and each of these relations poses a possible variation on the experiences 
that emerge from coordinated videogame play. 
 Having described these limitations, I turn now to a discussion of the model I 
use to make sense of my videogame play experiences.  
Model 
 Among Roman Jakobson’s contributions to the communication discipline is a 
“theory of language and communication [that] offers a synthetic approach to both the 
structural and functional components of language and speech” as the embodiment of 
that event-process we call human communication (Eicher-Catt, 2001, p. 103).  When 
describing the “constitutive factors of any speech event,” Jakobson (1960) explains: 
The ADDRESSER sends a MESSAGE to the ADDRESSEE.  To be operative 
the message requires a CONTEXT referred to (“referent” in another, 
somewhat ambiguous, nomenclature), seizable by the addressee, and either 
verbal or capable  of being verbalized; a CODE fully, or at least partially, 
common to the addresser and addressee (or in other words, to the encoder and 
decoder of the message); and, finally, a CONTACT, a physical channel and 
psychological connection between addresser and addressee, enabling both of 
them to enter and stay in communication. (p. 353, emphasis in original) 
Each element in the model “determines a different function of language,” says 
Jakobson (1960), yet in an communicative event one could “hardly find” one function 
operating independently of all others (p. 353).  Peterson & Langellier (2005) 
additionally caution that “the description of elements and functions should not be 
reduced to parts of a model as is often the case in information theory-based depictions 
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of communication” (p. 125).  In what follows, then, I “flesh out” Jakobson’s elements 
and their correlative functions – that is, I describe the ways in which meaningful 
experiences between players arise in the embodied and fleshy actualization of that 
which the model depicts – as they are present in the practice of playing videogames.  
This description situates videogames and the practice of videogaming in a larger 
academic discourse, and defines them for future exploration as communication 
phenomena. 
Contact 
 I begin my analysis where Jakobson (1960) concludes his explication of the 
speech event: the element of contact.  The contact element of human communication 
performs a phatic function, whereby communication is established, prolonged, 
maintained, modified, and/or discontinued (Jakobson, 1960; Peterson & Langellier, 
2005).  The workings of the phatic function, says Lanigan (2000), “are widely 
illustrated by the semiotic system of touch” (p. 101).  Thus, the contact element “may 
be displayed by a profuse exchange of ritualized formulas, by entire dialogues with 
the mere purport of prolonging communication” (Jakobson, 1960, p. 355), but it is 
also the very element at work when persons claim a communication event “moved” 
or “touched” them (Peterson & Langellier, 2005).  This element is integral to an 
understanding of videogaming as a meaningful, communicative practice for several 
reasons.  First, to say that this element establishes, maintains, prolongs, modifies and/ 
or discontinues communication is to situate its phatic function as a primary concern 
in an analysis of meaningful and coordinated action in unshared physical space – such 
as an ACWW town.  This function is imperative to counteracting popular discourse 
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about communication in mass-mediated contexts – discourse that typically paints 
these so-called “forms” of human communication as inadequate or somehow 
“beneath” a more conventional, “face-to-face” mode of human interaction (much like 
the discourse examined in Chapter 4, which accuses vidoegames of being things that 
do not matter).  While videogame play does represent a mode of discourse among 
many, this study refuses to devalue playing videogames as anything less than an 
embodied and meaningful practice.  Videogames allow players to contact one 
another, to “keep in touch” – to initiate and maintain communicative events – and for 
this reason cannot be reduced to as incidental or a mere “subset” of other modes of 
discourse. 
 Second, to say that videogames facilitate contact’s phatic function is to 
rightfully recognize that playing videogames is an embodied, meaningful, “touching” 
practice.  Recall from Chapter 4 the notion that videogames can “touch” players at an 
embodied level.  Additionally, the contact element’s phatic function is experienced 
by players who find the actions of other players in a shared gamespace “touching.”  
Simply put, videogame players can be touched by the intentional and purposive 
actions of other players, and recognizing the contact element’s presence in the 
communicative experience of videogaming is key. 
 Additionally, Jakobson (1960) notes in his explanation of the contact element 
that communication requires both “physical engagement” and and “intentional 
connection” (Peterson & Langellier, 2005, p. 127).  This observation positions my 
previous reflections as preconditions for the presence of the current one.  Playing 
videogames requires physical engagement – hands on a controller, a particular set of 
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bodily comportments and embodied knowledge, a certain relationship with material 
technologies, etc.  It also requires an intentional connection – a care-ful attitude 
toward the enworlded body-objects of the gameworld, an aesthetic and ethical passion 
for the quasi-subjects that material-ize in game space.  These preconditions are the 
subjects of Chapters 3 and 4, respectively. 
 Specifically in ACWW, for example, players initiate, prolong and maintain 
relationships via a variety of in-game situations that depend on various devices.  For 
instance, players’ avatars can share the same synthetic space and be privy to one 
another’s actions in a shared synthetic space, exchanging items and messages 
asynchronously but nevertheless intimately and quickly.  Or players might mail one 
another letters via the post offices in their respective towns.  Or, as I wrote: 
I’ve received a letter from someone named Kabuki, but I have no idea who 
this is.  I read the letter and discover that this particular animal doesn’t even 
live in my town!  Kabuki lives in Pondlton, a town maintained by another AC 
player with whom I’ve visited numerous times.  I vaguely recall speaking to 
Kabuki (I think she’s a koala) on one of my visits to Pondlton so many weeks 
ago.  The text of Kabuki’s letter is insignificant to me (I don’t even remember 
exactly what the koala wrote), but upon reading it I’m reminded of my friend, 
wonder how his peach orchard is coming along (I helped him get it started), 
and remind myself to drop him an email when I’ve finished playing.  I need to 
visit again soon. 
In this case, the actions of a computer-controlled character prompt my recollection of 
a relationship with another player.  Here, I am compelled to perform out-game 
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relational “maintenance” – namely, to write my “friend” and fellow player an email, 
to “get in touch” with her or him.  Even though we are not sharing the same synthetic 
space, we are still tethered by the joint practice of playing this game. 
I might pause here for a moment to clarify the nature of this contact, to avoid 
eventual confusion or conflation of terms.  I consider playing videogames in the 
manner I am here – online via the Internet, in a physical space apart from that 
embodied by other players – an interactive practice (as opposed to an intersubjective 
one).  This is to say that while playing videogames online with others is inherently 
meaningful, doing so can only approximate the experience of doing so in the 
company of fellow players (by playing, for instance, in “DS to DS” mode, in shared 
physical space).  The difference, as Langellier and Peterson (2004) argue, is one 
between feedback and calibration as distinguished by Gregory Bateson.  A player 
engaged in videogaming might “make continuous changes in her or his performance 
based on the feedback” of another player in shared space, while the same player 
engaged in wifi play might instead calibrate her or his performance, or adapt 
performative actions when a particular performance is finished (p. 164).  In the case 
of Internet-enabled, online videogame play, calibration of performative actions can 
occur quickly, as players gage one another’s responses to gamic action based on 
avatar movement, in-game text message swapping,  and so forth.  Videogames are 
interactive media inasmuch as they facilitate expedient calibration of gameplay 
performances between players (as addresser and addressee). 
 Because of its role in maintaining meaningful interaction between players, I 
emphasize the contact element and its correlative phatic function as integral to any 
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analysis of videogames’ role in allowing players to “touch” one another, or to “keep 
in touch” by playing videogames.  In doing so, players consciously experience 
nothing less than that which Merleau-Ponty calls “a veritable touching of the touch” 
(1968, p. 134), contact with others and (reversibly, as an experience of 
consciousness) themselves. 
Code 
 Also facilitating and constraining players’ experience of videogaming is an 
element Jakobson (1960) calls the code, which performs the metalinguistic function 
in communicative situations.  Codes are rules that govern the actions of bodies in 
space, and according to Lanigan (2000), can be viewed as time-binding, 
“supraindividual” norms (p. 99).  Jakobson (1960) notes that for communication to 
occur, both addresser and addressee must share (or “partially” share) a code (p. 353), 
as they draw on a “supply of ready-made forms” – conventions that make possible the 
generation and sharing of meaning (Peterson & Langellier, 2005).  Codes (i.e., 
systems of rules) are everywhere inscribed in the practice of videogaming.  Playing 
ACWW, for instance, involves the activation of codes not exclusive to the domain of 
videogaming, such as the use of English syntax when swapping messages in-game.  It 
also involves the use of codes exclusive to the domain of videogaming, such as 
generic motivators (i.e., the videogame’s status as a “shmup,” or shoot-’em-up, an 
RPG, or role-playing game, an FPS, or first-person shooter, an MMORPG, or 
massively-multiplayer online role-playing game, an RTS, or real-time strategy game), 
and button combinations/configurations players routinely enact to perform in-game 
actions.  These examples of code invocation indicate that codes present both in-game 
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and out-game twist and merge to govern action in both spaces.  In ACWW, for 
instance, players draw on traditional gift-giving conventions to govern and make 
sense of in-game item swapping, as well as capitalist economic conventions when 
paying in-game mortgages.  In-game action can also compel players to reflect on and 
modify out-game convention, as they establish certain “house rules” for playing their 
favorite games together, or reflect on their own spending habits as a result of 
economic conditions in-game (as is occasionally the case with The Sims). 
 The code performs its metalinguistic function as players are able to make 
language or the game itself the objects of discussion.  “Whenever the addresser 
and/or addressee need to check up on whether they use the same code, speech is 
focused on the CODE” (Jakobson, 1960, p. 356, emphasis in original).  For instance, 
as Bryan and Mr. Nova pick fruit, iamus types: “I’m going to buy something at your 
store.”  While uttered out-game this phrase might mark a person’s intention to 
purchase goods at a retailer, in-game this utterance is packed with different meanings 
that only “make sense” because of various codified conventions.  ACWW players 
make more purchases from the town store, Nook’s, the store’s proprietor (Nook) 
gradually upgrades the shop (presumably to accommodate the increase in sales).  The 
fourth and final iteration of Nook’s shop is called “Nookington’s,” a two-level mall 
that dwarfs all other versions of the establishment.  To compel Nook to renovate into 
Nookington’s, however, a player from another town must make a purchase at the 
shop.  In this case, then, iamus’ utterance – “I’m going to buy something at your 
store” – is foremost a comment directly about the game itself, as codified knowledge 
of the result this action will bring about is embodied by me (iamus is doing me a 
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favor, getting my shopkeeper to upgrade the store so that I might be privy to the 
related bonuses).  Also in this case, the “I” that is the subject of iamus’ utterance is 
iamus him/herself – one player is acting not as avatar but as player in helping another 
player unlock one of the game’s features.  The subject of the utterance and its 
function during our gameplay session both make sense to me because of the operation 
of particular codes. 
The elements of contact and code constitute an experiential ground for 
meaningful action in playing videogames by performing their correlative phatic and 
metalinguistic functions.  Bodily contact as a precondition or precursor to immanent 
experience necessarily constrains the range of possible metalinguistic functions 
available to consciousness (i.e., neither the body nor the videogame is “text all the 
way down”); or, put another way, contact necessarily constrains code (Catt, 2003).  In 
terms of gameplay, this means that embodied and physical engagement with 
videogames is tantamount to any understanding of a videogame’s possible “readings” 
(as for the narratologists) or “simulations” (as for the ludologists).  It also helps us 
make a key distinction between the type of experience with ACWW that I outline 
above and the type of experience detailed in an account of playing ACWW performed 
by Mark Hoppus, former frontman for pop-punk trio Blink 182, in his podcast: 
You know why else there hasn't been a podcast in way too long?  It's because 
I've been playing Animal Crossing: Wild World.  And yea!  It's true!  It's true, 
I love that [expletive deleted]!  My town will kick anybody's town's ass.  I 
have the coolest stuff.  Right now, uh, my character has a King's Beard.  I'm 
very anxiously awaiting the arrival of the King's Crown that I can buy.  I ... I 
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hear that it's gonna  cost 1.2 million bells.  You laugh!  But Animal Crossing: 
Wild World has actually brought my family together.  My sister and her 
husband both play Animal Crossing: Wild World, and I've never really talked 
to her husband all that much.  He's a cool guy, you know, awesome dude, but 
we never really spoke at all that much and now he and I call each other pretty 
much every day – “Hey what's for sale in your town?  What's going on in your 
town?  How much can you sell turnips for in your town?”  [laughs].  What a 
way to spend your thirties, right?  [Expletive deleted] guys, it's bringin' my 
family together. (2006, Episode 7) 
Hoppus’ experiencing is touching inasmuch as playing ACWW itself becomes a sort 
of code-condition for the establishment of communication – and keeping in touch – 
between himself and his brother-in-law.  However, as this experience does not 
necessarily involve contact at the site of the videogame itself, but rather in a 
technologically-facilitated, post-hoc storytelling session about that videogame, it is 
only tangentially related to the embodied practice of playing videogames. 
Addresser 
 Throughout this thesis project, I have stressed the importance of studying the 
practice of playing videogames from the point of chiasmic reversibility between 
player and game, and not (as the empiricists would have it) from clearly delineated 
positions of subject and object.  As I now turn to a discussion of addresser and 
addressee – two integral components of Jakobson’s model of human communication 
whose separation might seem to fly in the face of my previous reflections and 
interpretations – I certainly do not mean to eschew all prior attempts at carefully 
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articulating a reversible relationship between embodied player and enwordled game-
objects immanent in the flesh.  However, as this relationship is re-cognized as 
conscious experience in various modalities, I can nevertheless reflect on moments in 
which certain modes of experience become more salient than others.  As Merleau-
Ponty (1968) puts it: 
[. . .] We spoke summarily of a reversibility [. . .] of the touching and the 
touched.  It is time to emphasize that it is a reversibility always immanent and 
never realized in fact.  My left hand is always on the verge of touching my 
right hand touching the things, but I never reach coincidence; the coincidence 
eclipses at the moment of realization, and one of two things always occurs: 
either my right hand really passes over to the rank of touched, but then its hold 
on the world is interrupted; or it retains its hold on the world, but then I do not 
really touch it [. . .]. (p. 147-148) 
Reflection and perception necessarily cut the immanent reversibility of the touching 
and the touched; the fleshy contingency between the two is articulated in various 
modalities.  In the touching relationship between game and player, these modalities 
are re-cognized as ethical or aestheic sensibilities (see Chapter 4).  In the touching 
relationship between players, these modalities are re-cognized as modes of address 
embodied in and by an addresser and an addressee.  When reading Merleau-Ponty’s 
(1968) account of “a veritable touching of the touch” (p. 133-134) that guides this 
chapter, I recognize, as does Butler (2005): 
So when one touches a living and sentient being, one never touches a mass, 
for the moment of touch is the one in which something comes apart, mass 
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splits, and the notion of substances does not – cannot – hold.  That means that 
neither the subject who touches nor the one who is touched remains discrete 
and intact at such a moment [. . .]. (p. 197). 
Addresser and addressee are never completely discrete or intact, their very 
differentiation contingent upon imbrication with one another; immanent experiences 
are undifferentiated chiasmically before re-cognized as “this” or “that” type of 
experience located “here” or “there.”  These assumptions guide what remains of my 
interpretation of Jakobson’s model as it pertains to the communicative practice of 
playing videogames. 
 Jakobson’s addresser performs an emotive function, which “aims a direct 
expression of the speaker’s attitude toward what he [sic] is speaking about” (1960, p. 
354).  The addresser is that which encodes experience by binding past, present and 
future (Peterson & Langellier, 2005) when “engaging expressive units of language” 
(Lanigan, 2000, p. 97).  Typically, as Lanigan (2000) notes, the addresser articulates 
conscious experience in a form of the first-person utterance: “I am speaking” (p. 97).  
My position as addresser, then, is manifest throughout my gameplay descriptions 
recorded in my play journal, as I necessarily embody an emotive subject position in 
relation to other players (like iamus) and enworlded objects (like Nook, a tree, or a 
rock).  Statements like:  
Like many other videogame players, I use first-person pronouns when I talk 
about the action of my avatar in the space of the game.  “I just caught a bug!” 
or “I just paid my mortgage!”  But I also say things like “I miss Lobo” or “I 
really want to buy an extra table lamp for my in-home arcade.”  In these 
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statements, the pronoun refers to Bryan the Player, not Bryan the Avatar.  Or 
do they?  When I say things like “I just caught a bug!” I am speaking, of 
course, with a great deal of symbolism.  It’s cumbersome to say: “I just 
pressed this button, which acts as input for a computer to translate into binary 
code and render certain relationship [sic] visually on a touchable screen!”  
Nevertheless, the bug I just caught is rendered in the material of those binary 
digits, the same material of my avatar. Having become one of them, 
acquiescing to the reality of the rules that govern the world as well as the 
element binding, pervading and transcending all things in it, I nonetheless pre-
reflectively refer to the actions of my in-game avatar as my actions [. . .] 
The phrase “I am speaking” emerged in this account of my gameplay experience, 
indicating my role as addresser.  My experience of playing this videogame are 
encoded (that is, expressed) from this position as addresser; the use of first-person 
pronouns positions me as distinct from the heretofore undifferentiated flow of 
gameplay experience, yet even my attempts at describing my role as addresser are 
confounded and complicated by the difficulty in excising my-self entirely from the 
flesh of the gameworld.  This excerpt from my journal recounts an experience about 
experience; that is, it is an attempt at making sense of the way I make sense of my 
play experience, a commentary on the way I write about playing.  Nevertheless, I am 
here interrogating the use of first-person pronouns that manifest in my stream-of-
consciousness, present-tense narration of gameplay (similar to that of other players, 
who might say to one another, “Let me show you how to beat this level”). 
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 The addresser’s body is necessarily analog – fluid, ambiguious, and 
continuous.  This is to say the addresser’s modes of expression and perception operate 
by way of a both/and logic that allows re-cognition of both element and function; an 
addresser’s capacity to “make sense” of experience by encoding it (i.e., expressing it) 
invariably activates a related emotive capacity.  It also reflexively allows for the 
addresser’s re-cognition as both addresser and addressee. 
Addressee 
 For Jakobson (1960), an orientation toward the addressee is “vocative” (p. 
355).  An addresser’s emotive encoding of expression necessarily calls forth and 
situates an addressee.  Put another way, it is an acknowledgment of the imbricated 
nature of the addressee, already bound with addresser in the flesh of the world.  The 
addressee performs a conative function, decoding the message as perception.  
Because the body of the player necessarily operates according to a both/and logic, 
differentiating between addresser and addressee is an analogic matter.  An addresser 
becomes the addressee of his or her own utterance, as is evident in my experience of 
playing ACWW: 
Iamus and I are swapping items we’ve collected for one another over the past 
few weeks of playing independently (I am collecting the “Classic” set of 
furniture while he is collecting the “Modern” set).  To coordinate our dealings, 
we’re talking to each other – typing messages, letter-by-letter, on a synthetic 
keypad that appears on the DS’s bottom screen.  As I finish my statement and 
hit “enter,” the message disappears from the bottom screen with a “whoop!,” 
and appears now on the top screen, floating in a non-diegetic conversational 
 
 125
space translucently hovering above the town of Trantor.  In less than a second, 
I am reading what I wrote, awaiting iamus’ response. 
While I may presume that iamus-as-addressee is decoding my utterance by 
both reading it and typing a response, I should also presume similar activity on my 
part, as I am positioned as addressee “in less than a second,” immediately and at the 
same time of my emotive address.  The respective body of each player is capable of 
this analogic activity. 
 Yet the problem of address is a bit more complicated than the text-swapping 
of two persons in shared synthetic space can attest.  As discussed in Chapter 4, what I 
have so far called “the gameworld” is an amalgam of embodied subjects and 
enworlded objects necessarily emergent from the selfsame flesh, that element or 
condition of their touching relations.  Any account of address in videogames and the 
practice of videogaming must account for modes of address that articulate relations 
between and among all bodies, not only the human ones.  “The body is not the flesh,” 
according to Stormer (2004), yet emerges as an articulation of many possible 
arrangements or relations inherent in the flesh.  “Anything gains a body (an 
institution, a corpus, a text, a heavenly object) as it becomes a distinct entity within a 
system of perception and interrelationships” (p. 265).  The bodies that emerge from 
the chiasm, full as it is of possible articulations and interrelationships, each address 
and are addressed in their respective fashions. 
 Characteristic of the digital body-objects with which I and other players in my 
shared space interact routinely is a capacity to address and be addressed that 
manifests digitally as an either/or logic.  This is to say that any kind of “experience” 
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one might attribute to digital objects manifests as a simple activation or deactivation 
of capacity.  They serve as elements in communicative situations but the correlative 
functions of their intervention are nevertheless present as re-cognized by the analgoic 
capabilities of the embodied player (as Sobchack would have it, and as detailed in 
Chapter 4, these objects are prereflectively granted a quasi-subjectivity).  My own 
experience helps make sense of this issue: 
Harvesting peaches and selling them to Nook has become so routine for me 
that I really don’t need to think in order to do it anymore.  Armed with a full 
crop, I walk into Nookington’s and am instantly greeted by the raccoon in the 
same way he always greets me: “Welcome to Nookington’s!”  I tap the screen.  
“Let me know if I can be of service!”  Tap.  I walk up to Nook at tap Nook.  
“What can I do for you?”  I select “I want to sell” from the menu that appears 
on-screen, and proceed the same way I always do.  The taps are systematic; 
the text is meaningless. 
I address Nook by touching him, and am addressed by him when he begins running 
through his usual greeting.  Nook’s bodily capacity for addressing me is activated by 
my touch; he continues his address in the manner he “always” does – invariably, 
routinely, predictably.  Logically, Nook’s activity manifests digitally as either 
touched (and then greeting, routine) or untouched (silence).  The digital raccoon’s 
element as addresser is present in the communicative situation; his function as 
emotive is part and parcel of the quasi-subjectivity he develops as I re-cognize his 
role in our interaction (Sobchack, 2004).  I “hear” Nook’s emotive “voice” as part of 
this process.  However, the ritualized nature of the encounter makes the message 
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“meaningless.”  This term is a misnomer, however, as the gestalt produced by the 
repetition of an expected exchange is nevertheless an impetus to act in accordance 
with its perceived form (i.e., to touch Nook).  I have an embodied understanding of 
Nook’s rigid, digital invariability, and the code strips the message of any potential to 
surprise me.  The logical distinction between digital and analog becomes more 
important when discussing their synthesis in the poetic functioning of the message 
and the referential functioning of context created by communication. 
Message 
 For Jakobson (1960), a “focus on the message for its own sake” (p. 256) 
serves a poetic function as speakers creatively select and combine elements to 
produce something – a text, an utterance, a performance, an identity (Peterson & 
Langellier, 2005).  Relevant to the present study, Jakobson (1960) notes that the 
poetic function cannot be studied “out of touch with the general problems of 
language, and, on the other hand, the scrutiny of language requires a thorough 
consideration of its poetic function” (p. 356, emphasis added).  Functioning this way, 
the message is combinatory; it pulls together and articulates the various modes of 
address outlined above to establish its constitutive force.  For instance, as occurred 
when I played ACWW with iamus: 
We’re in my house for the “tour” now, and Mr. Nova hops up on my sofa.  He 
looks content for a few seconds, and then text appears on the screen: “Heh.  I 
just farted on your sofa.”  From my chair in my room, I chuckle out loud at 
this. 
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Here, iamus combines available elements to produce a message whose novelty and 
originality resonate deeply enough with my embodiment of our play as to evoke my 
laughter.  Because “virtually any poetic message is a quasi-quoted discourse,” iamus 
is able to draw on codified conventions of household visitation etiquette and violate 
them to produce humor (Jakobson, 1960, p. 371).  Because “the double-sensed 
message finds its correspondence in a split addresser, in a split addressee [. . .],” 
iamus is able to function as both comedian and audience for comedy that anticipates a 
response, as he observes the text of his message overlaid atop the on-screen situation.  
Because iamus comports his body in such a way that both moves Mr. Nova onto my 
digital sofa (activating its capacity to sit or not sit) and reflexively uses this situation 
in conjunction with codified convention, something (a performance of gastrointestinal 
discharge) is produced from the articulation of analog and digital bodies that 
transcends any heretofore material limitation of videogame system or structure. 
 Like a cast of anthropomorphized household objects observing Beauty’s 
dance with the Beast, attention to the message’s poetic function leads us to believe: 
“There must be something there that wasn’t there before.”  Emphasizing the poetic 
function of the message likewise emphasizes that human communication is both a 
doing (praxis) and a making (poiesis), say Peterson and Langellier (2005).  That 
which is created is context. 
Context 
 Context performs a referential function; mimicking Husserl, one might say 
that all communication is communication about something (even if, when 
emphasizing its metalinguistic function, communication is about communication 
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itself).  Playing videogames is communicative inasmuch as it is always enacted for 
some reason – it “must be relevant in some way, even if that relevance is yet to be 
revealed or discovered” (Peterson & Langellier, 2005, pp. 126-127).  Context is 
created during gameplay, such that it becomes a sort of “third person” in the 
communication event as the relationship that bridges-between (Jakobson, 1960, p. 
355); it illuminates meaning, frames every communicative situation in a spatio-
temporal “meaning-generating frame” (Eicher-Catt, 2001, p. 104).  This distinctly 
human capacity for meaning-making is a synthesis of logical addresses both analog 
and digital; the logic of context, according to Wilden (1987) is both (both/and) and 
(either/or). 
Playing videogames generates many such frames that illuminate the 
meaningful purpose of its enactment.  The generic guidelines codified in a particular 
videogame’s narrative text might work to make the game about “saving the princess” 
or “destroying the terrorists.”  Context generated by narrative illuminates these 
particular purposes for playing the videogame.  Other purposes might include ludic 
purposes, or goals of gameplay at a mechanical level.  Ludic frames codified in a 
particular videogame’s mechanics might work to make the game about “beating all 
the worlds” or “scoring the most points.”  Context generated by ludic frames 
illuminates these particular purposes for playing the videogame. 
When studying videogaming communicationally, we should also remember 
that the context for gameplay might not be one the game designers intended (in 
narrative, ludic, or any other type of pre-chosen contextual frame).  This is to say that 
meaningful interactions in, with, or through videogames may generate a context for 
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gameplay not inscribed in or codified as part of the videogame, apart from its 
enactment by players.  For instance, players can ignore entirely the designers’ 
“purposes” inscribed in Grand Theft Auto, and instead enact car-flipping 
competitions, running automobiles off cliffs and ramps to see how many 
summersaults they can perform.  The game suddenly becomes about “flipping the 
car,” an action that when performed in the designers’ “intended” context, is adverse 
and detrimental to a player’s progress. 
 Animal Crossing: Wild World might be a game about “running a town” or 
“being a good friend.”  It might be a game about “scoring the most bells” or 
“collecting all the furniture.”  When playing ACWW with iamus, however, the game 
is about something (means something) else: 
Outside, we are exploring my town when I notice Mr. Nova bolt offscreen.  I 
spin my avatar in circles, searching for him, but find no sign.  Above me, the 
text “I’m hiiiiiiding” appears, and now I know what’s going on.  I start to run 
through the peach orchards in search of Mr. Nova, but he’s eluded me.  Then, 
suddenly, he appears to Bryan’s left, runs up to him with a big catching net, 
and smacks Bryan over the head three times before darting off in a different 
direction. 
For iamus, ACWW is suddenly about this awkward yet creative session of Hide and 
Seek, and has me smiling from behind my Nintendo DS.  A context of choice – 
videogames’ available paths laid out by game designers or “narrative architects” – is 
converted to a choice of context by the poetic, productive practice of playing 
videogames. 
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CONCLUSION (GAME OVER) 
In Chapter 1, I stressed the importance of positioning the body as central to 
the study of videogames and the practice of videogaming (i.e., “playing 
videogames”).  Current avenues of research about videogaming ignore the 
experiential role of the body in this practice to the detriment of the field of videogame 
studies.   A focus on the lived experience of playing videogames, I argued in Chapter 
2, is necessary to understanding the ways in which this practice is communicative – 
that is, the ways videogames function in relation to expression and perception, in 
enabling and constraining symbolic practices, and in facilitating action between and 
among bodies.  Existential phenomenology is crucial to an exploration of such lived 
experience, as it theoretically eschews subject/object distinctions that have thus far 
plagued videogame studies, and methodologically generates genuinely new, heuristic 
spaces for thinking about videogaming.  Specifically, the existential phenomenology 
of Merleau-Ponty, with its emphasis on the body as necessarily enworlded, offers an 
insightful conceptualization of the videogame player’s activity.  By appropriating 
Merleau-Ponty’s numerous modalities of a particular embodied sense – touch – I was 
able, in Chapter 3, to begin an exploration of the ways in which the sensual touch of 
the player both intersects with a new material technology that facilitates gameplay 
(the Nintendo DS) by way of a touch-sensitive interface, and “crisscrosses” with a 
player’s embodied sense of sight – the sense heretofore elevated to omniscient status 
in the study and practice of videogaming.  Descriptions of these intersections and 
crisscrosses yielded interpretations of a corporeal schema with specific embodied 
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preferences for action in various gamic spaces: a being-in-the-(game)world.  I have a 
body that interacts with this technology, but I also am a body – a material object 
grounded in the self-same flesh of the world.  My interobjective relations with other 
enworlded body-objects thus became the subject of Chapter 4.  When I recognized 
that I am a passionate videogame player, I literally re-cognized my primordial, 
immanent and embodied abilities as both subjective object and objective subject to 
interpret my experiences being “touched” by the objects of the gameworld whose 
inhabitance I detailed in Chapter 3.  Descriptive re-cognition of my passionate 
suffering in relation to en(game)worlded, non-intentional objects yielded an 
interpretation of my embodied response-ability as an ethical responsibility to other 
body-objects in synthetic space.  Likewise, descriptive re-cognition of my passionate 
active devotion in relation to en(game)worlded, quasi-subjective body-objects yielded 
an interpretation of my embodied sense-ability as an aesthetic sensibility, or care-ful 
commitment to other quasi-subjects in synthetic space.  Having established two 
preconditions for sustaining the element of contact in Roman Jakobson’s model of 
human communication – physical engagement (Chapter 3) and intentional connection 
(Chapter 4) – I proceeded to explain the ways in which the body functions as a 
material locus where the reversibility of expression and perception are made manifest 
in human communication.  As “touching” the videogame and reversibly being 
“touched by” the videogame allow players to “keep in touch” by videogaming 
together, Chapter 5 detailed my experience playing videogames online with others.  
My descriptions of these videogaming experiences pointed to the presence of six 
elements and correlative functions integral to an understanding of human 
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communication, specifically situating videogames for study by the discipline of 
communication.  I described playing videogames as an interactive practice that 
synthesizes the analog (both/and) logic of human player-subjects and the digital 
(either/or) logic of game-objects as they emerge from an undifferentiated, chiasmic 
interrelationship.  Operating from a digital-analog logic – both (both/and) and 
(either/or) – allows players to convert contexts of choice into choices of context, 
making videogames about something that may or may not have “been there” before.  
Playing videogames is communicative inasmuch as it is capable of producing new 
contexts for players’ embodied experience. 
The game is, of course, not over.  My interpretation of the communicative 
practice of videogaming will inevitably become a description for countless more 
eidetic interrogations and empirical investigations.  My hope is that these will take up 
(even if only for the purpose of rejection) the set of theoretical tools I have offered in 
this thesis project, lest we forget the vital role the body – and all its material 
capacities and sensibilities – when studying videogames, playing videogames, and 
studying playing videogames. 
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ENDNOTES 
(BONUS STAGE) 
 
1 This is but one mode of parsing the fledgling field of videogame studies.  Wardrip-
Fruin and Harrington (2004) advance a similar paradigmatic division, separating 
research on the subject of “electronic games” into that which regards cyberdrama, 
ludology, critical simulation, game theories, and hypertexts and interactives.  In a 
somewhat different way, Juul (2005) traces the current state of the field by illustrating 
not various presuppositional sets, but rather thematic dichotomies around which 
current research seems to cluster.  These dichotomies include: games or players, rules 
or fiction, games or stories, games or the broader culture, and game ontology or game 
aesthetics. 
 
2 For instance, Wolf and Perron claim videogames are comprised of “graphics,” 
“interface,” “player activity,” and “algorithm” (2003, p. 15).  In a more general 
manner, Janet Murray (1997, p. 71) posits that all digital environments are interactive 
(that is, “procedural” and “participatory”) and immersive (that is, “spatial” and 
“encyclopedic”). 
 
3 “Although the term ‘video games’ first appears as a subject heading in the March 
1973 – February 1974 Readers Guide to Periodicals, articles on games appeared as 
 
 135
 
 
early as 1970 under the headings ‘Electronic Games’ and ‘Computer Graphics’” 
(Wolf and Perron, 2003, p. 2). 
 
4 In these experiments, subjects typically 1) play videogames for only short periods of 
time, 2) offer data to researchers in the form of quantifiable survey or self-report data, 
and 3) may or may not have a history of playing videogames as part of their everyday 
lives.  The first longitudinal study (Williams & Skoric, 2005) to investigate 
correlations between violence in the videogame Asheron’s Call 2 and aggressive 
beliefs and behaviors in players could not substantiate such correlations.  “Contrary to 
some expectations, there were no strong effects associated with aggression caused by 
this violent game [. . .] If such small effects do exist for this game, we cannot prove 
them here [. . .] [The data do] not offer strong support for the predictions suggested 
by [. . .] theoretical models postulating that violent games directly increase aggressive 
beliefs or behaviors” (p. 228).  Despite numerous contradictory findings and 
inconclusive studies, however, the notion of a causal correlation between violent 
videogames and aggressive behavior in players persists in academic and public 
consciousness.  Says Anderson (2004): “Basically, the scientific debate over whether 
media violence has an effect is over, and should have been over since 1975 [. . .] 
There are a number of negative bahvioural, cognitive, and affective consequences of 
exposure to violent entertainment media, in both the immediate context as well as 
developmentally over time [. . .] ” (p.114). 
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5 I agree with Castronova’s (2005) preference for the term “synthetic” as opposed to 
“virtual” when describing the “worlds” of online videogames.  This distinction 
correctly identifies the active, constructed nature of such spaces, rather than mere 
potentiality. 
 
6 This approach requires a perceptual shift – particularly, a move away from 
conceptualizations of communication predicated on informational models (such as 
those adopted by the traditional perspective on videogames).  Instead, Deetz (1994) 
indicates the necessity of a shift toward “communicational models” concerned not 
with how meanings are transmitted and reproduced, but with “alternative codes and 
how they constitute different human subjects and meanings” (p. 577). 
 
7 Frasca maintains the word “ludology” can denote any approach to game studies. 
 
8 Merleau-Ponty (2005) explains, “All my knowledge of the world, even my scientific 
knowledge, is gained from my own particular point of view, or from some experience 
of the world without which the symbols of science would be meaningless. The whole 
universe of science is built upon the word as directly experienced, and if we want to 
subject science itself to rigorous scrutiny and arrive at a precise assessment of its 
meaning and scope, we must begin by reawakening the basic experience of the world 
of which science is the second-order expression” (p. ix).  Or, more simply, “Science 
manipulates things and gives up living in them” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964b, p. 159). 
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9 Verbeek (2005) reminds us, “Phenomenology thus overcomes the dichotomy 
between subject and object, humans and world, by replacing it with a mutual 
interrelation.  Human beings are unthinkable apart from a relation to the world, which 
they continually experience and in which they realize their own existence” (p. 110), 
and that “Human beings are continually engaged with their world, and this 
engagement precedes any judgment they may have of it.  Put another way, it is 
impossible to speak about the world in the absence of human involvement with it [. . 
.].  There exists neither human beings in themselves nor world-in-itself” (p. 110). 
 
10 I am indebted to Dr. Isaac Catt for his many lectures explaining data (information) 
as hindsight, capta (knowledge) as insight, and acta (communication) as foresight. 
 
11 I do not mean for this introduction to provide an exhaustive epistemological history 
of touch, or a complete synthesis of phenomenological accounts of the sense.  I am 
purposefully selecting only a few accounts of touch in order to provide a ground for 
further argument. 
 
12 This is not to say that human experience of the world is ever essentially 
“unmediated.”  “Unmediated” for Ihde means, according to Verbeek (2005), merely 
unmediated by technologies. 
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13 Galloway (2006) calls these gamic moments nondiegetic machine acts, “actions 
performed by the machine and integral to the entire experience of the game but not 
contained within the narrow conception of the world of gameplay” (p. 28). 
 
14 “[. . .] The transcendence-in-immanence and the immanence-in-transcendence of 
the lived body is doubly and reversibly located: on the ‘no-thing-ness’ side our 
consciousness of ourselves is always only partial, consciousness being above 
explanation as the origin of explanations; on the “being” side our dense flesh is often 
opaque and below explanation, overrunning our consciousness and its 
comprehension” (Sobchack, 2004, p. 311). 
 
15  I qualify the word “virtual” with quotation marks because I disagree with its 
offhanded invocation in popular discourse in reference to something immaterial, 
transcendent, not-of-this-world, or ephemeral.  I instead tend to think about the 
virtual, as did Deleuze, as potential. 
 
16 This is not to say I believe the computer on which I write these words and the 
symbol of a computer – the lines of code parsed to render a familiar form on-screen in 
my house in the world of ACWW – are of the same logical type, or that there is no 
qualitative difference between the two.  While each functions differently from the 
other, they both nevertheless function, and their mutual grounding in the flesh 
indicates their respective abilities to interobjectively touch me. 
 
 139
 
 
17 Because of the reversibility of this system of relations, we, as body-objects, are also 
always quasi objects, according to Sobchack (2004): “ [. . .] We always exist as a 
qualified and quasi object – much as the object exists for us always (if much of the 
time, transparently) as a qualified and quasi subject” (p. 316, emphasis in original). 
 
18 In this way, ACWW is different from MMORPGs (massively multiplayer online 
role-playing games) because these games exist in spaces constantly populated by 
human-controlled avatars from all parts of the globe.  When players quit playing these 
games, they can assume that millions of other players around the world are still 
actively negotiating the gameworld, completing quests, accruing wealth, etc.  The 
world of ACWW is accessible to players when their Nintendo DS units are turned on, 
and typically, only one human-controlled player negotiates the world (the town) at 
once.  In cases where a player visits another player’s town, the host player must have 
her Nintendo DS unit powered on and actively occupied by her human-controlled 
avatar.  The town cannot exist – and the visiting player cannot visit – otherwise.  
Players can “move in” with one another – that is, permanently link their avatars to the 
same native gamespace so that both can occupy the same town with or without the 
presence of one another, but this scope is nowhere near that of an MMORPG (ACWW 
limits a town’s human-controlled avatar population to 4). 
 
19 For instance, if a player talks to animal residents on his birthday, the animals 
congratulate him and offer him birthday cake. 
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20 Sobchack (2004) notes that the flesh provides “both the enabling conditions and 
concrete premises for a single system of reversible valuation that does not bifurcate 
ethics and aesthetics as they emerge from and in our material existence,” though “this 
single system of valuation provides the grounds for more conscious differentiation of 
ethics (our reflective experience of response-ability) from aesthetics (our reflective 
experience of sense-ability)” (p. 295).  My phenomenological reflections here, then, 
consciously differentiate between videogames’ ethical and aesthetic capacities; 
however, such a bifurcation is a re-cognition in interpretation(s) of my fleshy 
experience. 
 
21 This is not to say, though, that the player cannot answer the cabbie’s questions with 
imagined answers based on a character or personality she or he has imagined.  The 
game’s setup, though, seems constructed purposefully to create a tight 
interrelationship between the body of the player and the body of the avatar. 
 
22 Galloway (2006) writes: “What is an algorithm if not a machine for the motion of 
parts?  And it is the artfulness of the motion that matters most” (p. xi). 
 
23 Discussing videogame addiction in these terms may help shed new light on some 
obsessive players’ desire to play videogames for extended and “harmful” periods of 
time. 
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APPENDIX: 
This advertisement signaled the launch of the Nintendo DS console in 2004. 
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